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I. INTRODUCTION
A majority of Americans receive health care under employee health care
plans. Employee health care plans and other employee welfare plans,2 such as
disability and life insurance plans, are governed by the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).3 The purpose of ERISA is "to
protect... the interests of participants in employee benefit plans and their
beneficiaries... by establishing standards of conduct, responsibility, and
obligation for fiduciaries of employee benefit plans, and by providing for
appropriate remedies, sanctions, and ready access to the Federal courts." 4
Although this purpose is clear in the Act and its legislative history, judicial
decisions have reshaped ERISA in far-reaching ways so that it now often serves
as a shield for employers, insurance companies, and plan administrators, rather
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I In 1988, according to United States Census Bureau figures, 150.4 million Americans
received their health care coverage from employee benefits plans. See BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF CONMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRAcr OF THE UNITED STATES 100
(1991).
2 See Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), Pub. L. No. 93-
406, § 3(1), 88 Stat. 829, 833 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1)). The terms "employee
welfare benefit plan" or "welfare plan" include health care, accident, disability, death
benefit, and other employee benefits plans. See id In this Article, such plans are referred to
generally as employee benefits plans.
3 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). For a general introduction to
ERISA, see RONALD J. COOKE, ERISA PRACnCE AND PRoCEDURE (1993); HENRY H.
PERRrr, JR., EMPLOYEE BENEFITs CLAIMS LAW AND PRACrICE (1990); Jay Conison,
Foundations of the Common Law of Plans, 41 DEPAUL L. REV. 575 (1992).
4 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b).
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than to protect participants' rights.5 The extent to which ERISA now serves the
converse of its original purpose is suggested by the advice one commentator
has given to lawyers defending benefits plans against participants' claims: "On
issues ranging from punitive and extracontractual damages to jury trials, the
'ERISA Umbrella' offers a wealth of strategic advantages in defending insurers
against claims of improper administration of employee benefit plans." 6
This Article reviews the principal judicial decisions that have transformed
ERISA into a defendants' shield and suggests the practical consequences that
these decisions have had on the ability of ERISA-plan participants and
beneficiaries to develop successfully their claims for health care, disability, and
other employee benefits. 7 The Article then examines current legislative efforts
to protect health care claimants, includind those proposals made as part of
general health care reform.8 The Article concludes by identifying the principal
elements of meaningful reform-reform that is necessary if ERISA's promise
of protection for participants in employee benefits plans is to be realized. 9
II. THE SETTNG
It is a period of "tumultuous economic, social and political changes
shaking the worlds of health care and insurance." 10 The cost of health care in
the United States more than doubled during the 1980s1' and continues to grow
5 Recently, in Mertens v. Hewitt Associates, 113 S. Ct. 2063 (1993), Justice White,
joined in dissent by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Stevens and O'Connor, wrote that
the Court was interpreting ERISA § 502(a)(3) to "deprive beneficiaries of remedies they
enjoyed prior to the statute's enactment." Id. at 2078 (White, J., dissenting). For a valuable
discussion of the degree to which the original purposes of ERISA have been undercut, see
William K. Carr & Robert L. Liebross, Wrongs Without Rights: The Need for a Strong
Federal Common Law of ERISA, 4 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 221 (1993). "Employees
frequently are cheated out of employer-provided pension, health insurance, and severance
pay benefits. The reason is simple: the courts do not construe the law to protect them." Id.
at 221.
6 James L. Nolan & Eunice L. Bumgardner, Defending the Insurance Company
Against Claims for Wrongful Denial in Administration of Employee Benefits Plans, ALI-
ABA Course of Study, Jan. 16, 1992, available in WESTLAW, C719 ALI-ABA 129, at
169.
7 See infra parts Ill-V.
8 See infra part VI.
9 See infra part VIE.
10 Robert Pear, Leading Health Insurers into a New Age, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 1992,
§ 3, at 11.
I1 In 1980, $249.1 billion was spent on health care; by 1989, this figure had reached
$604.1 billion. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, supra note 1, at 92.
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at a rate that is said to threaten the nation's economy. 12 Employers, faced with
paying a large part of the bill, increasingly have demanded controls on rising
insurance costs, and insurers have responded by instituting an array of cost
containment mechanisms. 13 These mechanisms include utilization review and
managed care procedures under which physicians' treatment decisions are
reviewed by insurance companies or independent utilization review
companies. 14  Such reviews often lead to disagreement about the
appropriateness or necessity of medical care. 15 Disputes arise about issues like
12 Robert Pear, Health-Care Costs Up Sharply Again, Posing New Threat, N.Y.
TIMs, Jan. 5, 1993, at Al, AlO. The Department of Commerce reported that $942.5
billion was spent on health care in 1993 and that the figure will rise to $1.06 trillion in
1994. Robert Pear, $1 Trillion in Health Costs Is Predicted, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 1993, at
A12.
13 See Mary R. Kohler, Note, When the Whole Exceeds the Sun of Its Pa.s: Why
Edsting Utilization Management Practices Don't Measure Up, 53 U. Prrr. L. REV. 1061,
1098 (1992).
Government, business, insurers, institutional providers such as hospitals and health
maintenance organizations, and virtually everyone else with a major financial stake in
health care now control their resources with a striking array of cost-containment and
profit-producing measures, ranging from managed care and intensive utilization review
to caps on coverage and restrictions on eligibility.
E. Haavi Morreim, Gaining the Systen: Dodging the Rules, Ruling the Dodgers, 151
ARCHIVES INERNAL MED. 443, 444 (1991).14 See, e.g., Thomas M. Burton, Firms That Promise Lower Medical Bills May
Increase Them, WALL ST. J., July 28, 1992, at Al, A9.
[Utilization review] firms have become immensely popular with employers seeking to
control their health-care costs. According to a survey conducted by trade publisher
Faulkner & Gray Inc., U.S. employers and insurance companies this year alone will
pay an estimated $7 billion to have their medical expenses reviewed. Utilization review
firms perform that service by questioning the necessity both of recommended treatment
and treatment already administered.
Id. at Al. See generally John Iglehart, The American Health Care System" Managed Care,
327 NEW ENG. . MED. 742 (1992); Arnold S. Relman, Controlling Costs by "Managed
Competition": Would It Work?, 328 NEw ENG. J. MED. 133 (1993).
15 See, e.g., Lisa Belkin, Under New Health Plans, Patients Change Habits, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 6, 1993, at Al, B2; Milt Freudenheim, The Physcians' View When Managed
Care Comes to Town, N.Y. TMEs, June 14, 1992, § 3, at 4; Gina Kolata, When Doctors
Say Yes and Insurers No, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 16, 1992, § 3, at 1, 6; Elisabeth Rosenthal,
Insurers Second-Guess Doctors, Provoking Debate over Savings, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 24,
1993, at Al.
19941
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
the proper length of a hospital stay, the medical necessity of services such as
nursing care, and the experimental nature of a particular treatment. Protracted
delays in approving or disapproving recommended treatment can occur. 16
In another effort at cost control, a growing majority of the nation's largest
employers now self-insure against the health care claims of their employees. 17
Under ERISA, such self-insured health care plans escape all state laws
regulating insurance companies.18 Self-insurance by large employers and other
changes in the health insurance market have led to increased competition
among insurance companies. 19
Finally, during the 103d Congress, various sponsors including President
Clinton proposed complex plans to revamp the nation's health care system.20
These efforts at health care reform gave rise to unprecedented lobbying and
media campaigns by insurance companies and insurance industry organizations,
physicians and hospital groups, corporations and business groups, and public
interest and consumer groups. Congressional debate became factionalized and
highly partisan, grinding to a halt under threats of filibuster without a vote in
either the Senate or House of Representatives on any of the reform proposals. 21
16 See Burton, supra note 14, at A9.
17 EPLOYER HEALTH CARE COST CONTAINMENT 15 (Jon Liebman ed.) (Leonard
Davis Inst. of Health Economics, Univ. of Pa., Factpack Series No. 10, 1986); Dale A.
Rublee, Self-Funded Health Benefit Plans, 255 JAMA 787, 790 (1986). "Disputes over
claims have become more frequent as [self-insured] employers and health plans try to curb
costs by refusing to pay for certain medical tests, devices and procedures that doctors say
are necessary." Robert Pear, State Regulators Seek Power over Self-Insured Employers,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 1994, atB7.
18 See infra part fIM.C.
19 See, e.g., Milt Freudenheim, The Unquiet Future of Commercial Health Insurance,
N.Y. TMEs, July 12, 1992, § 3, at 11; John K. Iglehart, The American Health Care System:
Private Insurance Health Policy Report, 326 NEW ENG. I. MED. 1715, 1716 (1992);
Wendy K. Mariner, Problems with Eployer-Provided Health Insurance: The Employee
Retirement Income Security Act and Health Care Reform, 327 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1682,
1684 (1992).
2 0 See, e.g., H.R. 3600, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1993), and S. 1757, 103d Cong., 2d
Sess. (1993) (President Clinton's Health Security Act); H.R. 1200, 103d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1993), and S. 491, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (McDermott-Wellstone American Health
Security Act of 1993); H.R. 3080, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1993), and S. 1533, 103d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1993) (Michel-Lott Affordable Health Care Now Act of 1993); H.R. 3222, 103d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1993), and S. 1579, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (Cooper-Breaux
Managed Competition Act of 1993); H.R. 3704, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1993), and S. 1770,
103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1993) (Thomas-Chafee Health Equity and Access Reform Today Act
of 1993).
2 1 See Adam Clymer, National Health Program, President's Greatest Goal, Declared
Dead in Congress, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 27, 1994, at Al, B10; Why Health Care Fizzled: Too
[V/ol. 55:723
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For the immediate future, congressional impasse may shift some of the health
care debate to state legislatures, 22 but the insurance and health care problems
that stirred such heightened nationwide controversy in 1993 and 1994 are not
likely to disappear. In the words of one observer, "mhe whole noisy,
confusing, troubling, expensive health care struggle will almost certainly end
up back in Washington."23
This is the troubled context in which the rights of health care claimants
under ERISA must be analyzed.
I. PREEMpTION OF PROTECTIONS AGAINST BAD FArIH AND UNFAIR
CLAIMS PRACTICES
Historically, and particularly since the enactment of the McCarran-
Ferguson Act, 24 regulation of the business of insurance has been left to the
states. When fashioning a preemption clause in ERISA, Congress seemed
careful not to create the regulatory void that would arise if ERISA were to
preempt state regulation of insurance. Although the preemption clause in
ERISA is sweeping-the Act supersedes "any and all State laws insofar as they
Little Tne and Too Much Politics, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 1994, at Bl.
22 See Milt Freudenheim, Insurance Companies Expect Battle over Health Care to
Shift to the States, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 23, 1994, § 1, at 22; State Offcials Strive to Bring the
Health Care Debate Home, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 1994, § 1, at 30.
23 Robin Toner, Ills of Health System Outlive Debate on Care, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 2,
1994, § 4, at 1, 4.
If the Federal Government does not restructure the health care system this
year,. . . experts say, it only means that the system will continue to be restructured
piecemeal by employers and massive insurance companies and managed care networks.
If Congress cannot reach a consensus on how to regulate these changes, and deal with
some of the problems of cost and coverage, it only means that the pressure will grow
on the states to do so, piecemeal-which means the chorus may rise once again for
uniform Federal laws.
Id. at 1.
24 In 1868, the Supreme Court held that the business of insurance is not commerce
within the meaning of the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution, leaving the
federal government without a basis for regulating insurance companies. See Paul v.
Virginia, 75 U.S. 168, 183 (1868). This decision was overturned by United States v. South-
Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944), but shortly thereafter, Congress enacted
the McCarran-Ferguson Act, ch. 20, 59 Stat. 33 (1945) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1011-1015 (1988)).
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may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan725-with respect to
insurance, Congress expressly limited ERISA preemption by providing in the
so-called saving clause: "[Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to
exempt or relieve any person from any law of any State which regulates
insurance... ."26 State law is defined to include "all laws, decisions, rules,
regulations, or other State action having the effect of law." 27 Limiting the
sweep of ERISA preemption is consistent with the McCarran-Ferguson Act.
Section 2 of that Act provides: "No Act of Congress shall be construed to
invalidate, impair, or supersede any law enacted by any State for the purpose
of regulating the business of insurance... unless such Act specifically relates
to the business of insurance .... .28 The legislative effort to preserve state
regulation of insurance has been undercut by judicial decisions preempting state
common law actions against insurers, preempting actions based on state unfair
insurance practices statutes, preempting state regulation of self-insured benefits
plans, and preempting actions based on wrongful insurer utilization review
practices.
A. Preemption of State Common Law Actions
The apparent congressional purpose of saving all state law regulating
insurance, including state decisional law, was frustrated by the Supreme
Court's decision in Pilot Life Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux.29 In Pilot Life, the
Court held that an action based on Mississippi law for wrongful handling of an
insurance claim was preempted by ERISA.30 The adverse effect of this decision
for ERISA participants has been the nullification of an important body of state
law regulating insurance-state decisional law providing protections against the
improper processing of insurance claims.
Before the advent of insurance bad faith law, in an action against an insurer
for the wrongful denial of a claim, damages were limited to the amount due
under the insurance contract. Under this rule, the greatest risk faced by an
insurer in delaying or denying a claim was a judgment requiring payment of the
amount due under the contract. Beginning in 1973, a growing number of state
25 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a).
26 Id. § 1144(b)(2)(A).
27 Id. § 1144(c)(1).
28 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1988). For an informative introduction to the history and
interpretation of the ERISA preemption clause, see Daniel M. Fox & Daniel C. Schaffer,
Health Policy and ERISA: Interest Groups and Semipreerption, 14 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y
& L. 239 (1989).
29 481 U.S. 41 (1987).
3 0 Id at 57.
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courts, and now a clear majority, have allowed actions against insurance
companies for the mishandling of first-party, non-ERISA, insurance claims.31
Recognition of such actions began with the decision of the California Supreme
Court in Gruenberg v. Aetna Insurance Co. 32 In Gruenberg, the court held:
"[W]hen the insurer unreasonably and in bad faith withholds payment of the
claim of its insured, it is subject to liability in tort."33
In Pilot Life, the plaintiff brought several state law claims, including a bad
faith claim,34 against the insurer, which provided an employment-related, long-
term disability plan. The plaintiff alleged wrongful mishandling of his disability
claim and sought damages for failure to provide benefits under the insurance
policy, general damages for mental and emotional distress, and punitive
damages.35 The Supreme Court held that the plaintiff's state law claims against
the insurer were preempted by ERISA. 36
This ruling distorts the relationship between ERISA-plan claimants and
insurance companies underwriting ERISA benefits plans. Preemption of state
law bad faith claims not only deprives claimants of compensation for
consequential harm and eliminates deterrence of bad faith conduct on the part
of insurance companies, but preemption of bad faith claims also makes it
economically rational for insurance companies to delay or deny payment of
claims because there is no cost to fear from doing so. In the words of a
congressional report:
[L]ittle financial downside exists for an insurance company that routinely
delays payment or refuses to pay large claims. ... [E]ven if a suit is brought
and the court finds that the insurance company has behaved in the most
egregious and outrageous way, the worst that could happen to the insurance
company is that it would be forced to pay the claim it should have paid in the
31 See STEPHEN S. ASHLEY, BAD FArrH ACTONs: IABILrrT AND DAMAGEs §§ 2:10-
:15 (rev. ed. 1992 & Supp. 1994); see also PROPERTY INSURANCE LAW CoMMrrrEE, ABA
TORT AND INSuRANcE PRACTrcE SECION, BAD FAnTH AND PuNrrvE DAMAGEs:
ANNOTATIONS TO FIRST-PARTY INSURANCE CASEs, STATUrES, AND REGULATIONS (1986 &
Supp. 1993).
32 510 P.2d 1032 (Cal. 1973).
33 Id. at 1038.
34 In Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mississippi, Inc. v. Campbell, 466 So. 2d 833
(Miss. 1985), the Mississippi Supreme Court stated: "We have come to term an insurance
carrier which refises to pay a claim when there is no reasonably arguable basis to deny it as
acting in 'bad faith,' and a lawsuit based upon such an arbitrary refusal as a 'bad faith'
cause of action." ld. at 842 (denying rehearing).
35 Pilot Lfe, 481 U.S. at 43-44.
36 Id. at 57.
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first place.37
The Pilot Life decision has made fair settlement of claims impossible for
ERISA-plan claimants. With an insurance company's exposure limited to the
amount of benefits payable under the policy, it can maintain an inflexible
negotiating posture, confident that it will pay less than its full-coverage
obligations in all disputes that are ultimately settled, as most must be. By
maintaining an uncompromising negotiating position, the insurance company
retains its funds, exhausts plaintiffs' resources, and spreads word to the
plaintiffs' bar that ERISA-plan claimants simply cannot win, discouraging the
bringing of other suits. 38
The Pilot Life decision has had consequences more far-reaching than the
preemption of common law bad faith claims. In the first part of the opinion, the
Court examined ERISA's express preemption clause39 and found plaintiff's
claims preempted by applying the analysis set forth in Metropolitan Life
Insurance Co. v. Massachusetts.40 Perhaps recognizing that this analysis gave
37 H.R. REP. No. 1023, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 23-24 (1992).
38 For testimony regarding the consequences of Pilot Life for ERISA welfare benefits
claims, see Bills Relating to ERISA's Preemption of Certain State Laws: Hearings on H.R.
1602 and H.R. 2782 Before the Subcomm. on Labor-Management Relations of the House
Conm. on Education and Labor, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); see also Carr & Liebross,
supra note 5, at 223-24; Robert L. Aldisert, Note, Blind Faith Conquers Bad Faith: Only
Congress Can Save Us After Pilot Life Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux, 21 LoY. L.A. L. REV.
1343, 1347 (1988). For discussion of the effect of ERISA preemption on health care
provider misrepresentation claims, see Jeffrey A. Branch, Health Care Providers Meet
ERISA: Are Provider Caims for Misrepresentation of Coverage Preempted?', 20 PEPP. L.
REV. 497 (1993). Several courts have held that, unlike participants' or beneficiaries' claims,
health care providers' state law claims against insurers or plan administrators are not
preempted by ERISA. See, e.g., Lordmann Ents., Inc. v. Equicor, Inc., 32 F.3d 1529,
1532-34 (11th Cir. 1994); Hospice of Metro Denver, Inc. v. Group Health Ins. of Okla.,
Inc., 944 F.2d 752, 753-56 (10th Cir. 1991); Memorial Hosp. Sys. v. Northbrook Life Ins.
Co., 904 F.2d 236, 243-50 (5th Cir. 1990).
39 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a).
40 471 U.S. 724 (1985). In Metropolitan Life, the Court held that, as applied to
insurance policies purchased by employee health care plans regulated by ERISA, a
Massachusetts statute requiring minimum mental health care benefits was not preempted by
ERISA, because the state statute was saved as a law that regulates insurance.
In Pilot Life, the Court drew upon the Metropolitan Life analysis first by finding that
plaintiff's common law causes of action based upon state law of bad faith "relate to" an
employee benefits plan and, therefore, fall under ERISA's express preemption clause unless
the state law of bad faith is saved as a law "which regulates insurance." Pilot Life, 481 U.S.
at 47-48. The Court then conducted a two-fold inquiry to determine whether the state bad
faith law "regulates insurance." The Court first took what it called a "common-sense view"
[Vol. S5:723
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weak support to the conclusion that the Mississippi law of bad faith was
expressly preempted, the Court went on to articulate a second, much broader
ground for its decision-implied preemption based upon ERISA's civil
enforcement provision, section 502(a) of the Act.41 In the Court's view, the
of the language of the saving clause and made the assertion, by no means self-evident, that
"[a] common-sense view of the word 'regulates' would lead to the conclusion that in order
to regulate insurance, a law must not just have an impact on the insurance industry, but
must be specifically directed toward that industry." Id. at 50. Then the Court applied the
remaining consideration drawn from Metropolitan Life, examining whether the state law of
bad faith met the criteria used to identify the "business of insurance" under the McCarran-
Ferguson Act. In cases under the McCarran-Ferguson Act, the Court had employed the
following criteria to determine whether a particular practice falls within the Act's reference
to the "business of insurance," which the states were empowered to regulate: (1) whether a
practice had the effect of transferring or spreading a policyholder's risk; (2) whether a
practice was an integral part of the policy relationship between the insurer and the insured;
and (3) whether a practice is limited to entities within the insurance industry. Id. at 50-51.
The Court concluded that consideration of these criteria did not support the assertion that
the Mississippi law of bad faith "regulates insurance." Id.
41 Section § 502(a) provides:
A civil action may be brought-
(1) by a participant or beneficiary-
(A) for the relief provided for in subsection (c) of this section [relief
relating to requests to the plan administrator for information], or
(B) to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan, to enforce
his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits
under the terms of the plan;
(2) by the Secretary, or by a participant, beneficiary or fiduciary for appropriate
relief under section 1109 of this title [relating to breach of fiduciary duty];
(3) by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary (A) to enjoin any act or practice
which violates any provision of this subehapter or the terms of the plan, or (B) to obtain
other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress such violations or (fi) to enforce any
provisions of this subchapter or the terms of the plan;
(4) by the Secretary, or by a participant, or beneficiary for appropriate relief in the
case of a violation of 1025(c) of this title [relating to information to be furnished to
participants];
(5) except as otherwise provided in subsection (b) of this section, by the Secretary
(A) to enjoin any act or practice which violates any provision of this subchapter, or (B)
to obtain other appropriate equitable relief i) to redress such violation or (ii) to enforce
any provision of this subchapter;
(6) by the Secretary to collect any civil penalty under subsection (c)(2) or (i) or ()
of this section;
(7) by a State to enforce compliance with a qualified medical child support order
(as defined in section 1169(a)(2)(A) of this title);
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provisions of section 502(a) set forth a "comprehensive civil enforcement
scheme." 42 According to the Court, the care with which ERISA's civil
enforcement remedies were drafted and the balancing of policies embodied in
the choice of remedies implied that ERISA's civil enforcement remedies were
intended to be exclusive. 43
The Court's finding in Pilot Life of an implied basis for preemption of state
law despite an express preemption provision is inconsistent with the Court's
more recent analysis of preemption in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.44 In
Cipollone, the Court concluded that, when Congress has considered the issue
of preemption and has included in the legislation a provision explicitly
addressing the issue, there is no need to infer congressional intent from other
provisions of the legislation: "Congress' enactment of a provision defining the
pre-emptive reach of a statute implies that matters beyond that reach are not
pre-empted." 45 If this principle had been applied in Pilot Life, the Court would
not have gone beyond analysis of the express preemption provisions to infer
congressional intent that ERISA's civil enforcement scheme be exclusive. By
incorporating the broader, exclusive-remedy analysis in Pilot Life, however,
the Court has influenced other courts to hold that, even when state law
"regulates insurance" and therefore fits squarely within the saving clause of the
(8) by the Secretary, or by an employer or other person referred to in section
1021(f)(1) of this title, (A) to enjoin any act or practice which violates subsection (0 of
section 1021 of this title [relating to information necessary to comply with Medicare and
Medicaid Coverage Data Bank requirements], or (B) to obtain appropriate equitable
relief (i) to redress such violation or (ii) to enforce such subsection; or
(9) in the event that the purchase of an insurance contract or insurance annuity in
connection with termination of an individual's status as a participant covered under a
pension plan with respect to all or any portion of the participant's pension benefit under
such plan constitutes a violation of part 4 of this title or the terms of the plan, by the
Secretary, by any individual who was a participant or beneficiary at the time of the
alleged violation, or by a fiduciary, to obtain appropriate relief, including the posting of
security if necessary, to assure receipt by the participant or beneficiary of the amounts
provided or to be provided by such insurance contract or annuity, plus reasonable
prejudgment interest on such amounts.
29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (as amended by the Pension Annuitants Protection Act of 1994, Pub.
L. No. 103-401, 108 Stat. 4172).
42 PilotLife, 481 U.S. at 54.
43 Id.
44 112 S. Ct. 2608 (1992). In Cipollone, the Court considered whether federal statutes
requiring warning labels on cigarette packages preempted plaintiff's common law claims
against various cigarette manufacturers. For an analysis of Gpollone, see The Supreme
Cou-Leading Cases, 106 HARv. L. REV. 163, 347-57 (1992).
45 ipollone, 112 S. Ct. at 2618.
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ERISA preemption provisions, a state law remedy based on such law win
nevertheless be preempted impliedly because Congress intended ERISA's civil
enforcement scheme to be exclusive.46
B. Preemption of State Statutory Actions
The implied-preemption analysis in Pilot Life has encouraged courts to
dismiss actions by ERISA-plan claimants that are based on state unfair
insurance claim settlement statutes.
In 1971, the National Association of Insurance Commissioners
promulgated amendments to its model act,47 specifically defining a variety of
unfair claim settlement practices. 48 Forty-three states have enacted or adopted
versions of these amendments in their laws regulating insurance companies.49
Generally, the specified unfair claim settlement practices are similar to the
types of insurance company practices that would support common law bad faith
actions. The specified unfair practices include "misrepresenting pertinent facts
or insurance policy provisions relating to coverages at issue"; "refusing to pay
claims without conducting a reasonable investigation based upon all available
information"; and "not attempting in good faith to effectuate prompt, fair and
equitable settlements of claims in which liability has become reasonably
clear." 50 A number of states have allowed private actions under such unfair
claim settlement practices statutes. 51
Following Pilot Life, various courts have had to consider whether private
actions under state unfair claim settlement statutes might be saved from
46 See infra part IRL.B.
47A Acr RELATING TO UNFAIR METHODS OF COMPETITION AND UNFAIR AND
DECPPTIVE Acrs AND PRAcrIcEs IN THE BusINEss OF INSURANCE (Nat'l Ass'n Ins. Comm'rs
1985) [hereinafter MODEL Acr], reprinted in ASHLEY, supra note 31, app. I.
48 Believers in the inherent goodness of human nature might perceive the
commissioners' 1971 amendments to the model act as a manifestation of their deep
concern for insurance consumers. Skeptics, however, might regard as noteworthy the
fact that at the same time there were four bills pending in Congress to give the Federal
Trade Commission enforcement powers against insurance companies, that claim-related
complaints had increased at an unprecedented rate, and that the insurance
commissioners have rarely exercised their new statutory powers to protect insurance
consumers from unfair claim settlement practices.
ASHLEY, supra note 31, § 9:02 (footnotes omitted).
49 Id.
50 MODEL Acr, supra note 47, §§ 4(9)(a), (d), (f).
51 See ASHLEY, supra note 31, § 9:03.
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preemption even though state common law claims are preempted. In Goodrich
v. General Telephone Co., 52 a California appellate court distinguished Pilot
Life, holding that ERISA does not preempt a claim for damages under the
unfair claim settlement practices provisions 53 of the California Insurance
Code. 54 However, Goodrich was overruled by the California Supreme Court in
Commercial Life Insurance Co. v. Superior Court.55 The court concluded that
Pilot Life's teaching that Congress intended the remedies set forth in ERISA to
be exclusive was controlling, and held that ERISA preempts private causes of
action under the state insurance code.5 6
52 241 Cal. Rptr. 640 (1987), overruled by Commercial Life Ins. Co. v. Superior
Court, 764 P.2d 1059 (Cal. 1988).
53 CAL. INS. CODE § 790.030) (West Supp. 1993).
5 4 In a carefully reasoned opinion, the court found that the relevant section of the state
insurance code squarely met the criteria for a law that "regulates insurance" set forth in
Pilot Life. The court acknowledged that upholding a private cause of action under the
insurance code would be inconsistent with the finding in Pilot Life that the civil enforcement
provisions of ERISA are exclusive. However, the court stated:
This inconsistency is not of our making. Rather it is the inevitable result of inherently
inconsistent goals expressed in the ERISA preemption provisions. On one hand
Congress expressed the intent to establish a uniform federal common law of rights and
obligations under ERISA. Yet on the other hand Congress recognized the long-standing
policy of deference to state regulation of insurance. Congress reaffirmed this deference
twice in ERISA: once in the insurance savings clause (see. 1144(b)) and again in
section 1144(d) which prevents ERISA from being construed to "impair or supersede
any law of the United States" including the McCarran-Ferguson Act.
Goodrich, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 647 (citing Pilot Life) (citation omitted).
55 764 P.2d 1059 (Cal. 1988).56 Id. at 1065-66. Justice Mosk wrote a sharp dissent, criticizing the "common sense"
analysis in Pilot Life and commenting generally about preemption:
There is a growing and ominous trend toward federal preemption of issues that
belong within the sphere of control by the individual states. And these inroads into
traditional federalism are taking place despite their inconsistency with pious rhetoric
emanating from Washington about returning government to the people at state and local
levels.
Id. at 1069 (Mosk, J., dissenting); see also Kanne v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 859
F.2d 96, 99-101 (9th Cir. 1988) (per curiam) (similarly concluding that Pilot Life's
preemption holding prevented an ERISA-plan claimant from bringing a private action for
improper claims processing under the state insurance code), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 906
(1989).
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C. Preemption of State Regulation of Self-Insured Plans
After Pilot Life, the Supreme Court decided another preemption case,
which further undercut the states' ability to regulate benefits plans governed by
ERISA. In FMC Corp. v. Holliday,57 the Supreme Court considered the effect
of ERISA preemption provisions upon a Pennsylvania state law that prohibited
employee benefits plans from exercising subrogation rights against a claimant's
tort recovery.5 8 The ERISA plan in question was a self-funded, or self-insured,
health care plan: the employer did not purchase insurance to provide the health
care benefits. In recent years, a substantial majority of large employers have
converted their health care plans from insurance-based plans to self-insured
plans.5 9 Because the health care coverage of a growing majority of Americans
is provided by such self-insured plans, the question of whether such plans are
subject to state regulation is of broad import.
As in Pilot Life, the Court in Holliday was called upon to apply the
provisions of the preemption clause, section 514(a) of ERISA. 60 The Court
first determined that the state statute was not preempted, because it fell within
the insurance saving clause, section 514(b)(2)(A), which provides: "Except as
provided in subparagraph (B), nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to
exempt or relieve any person from any law of any State which regulates
insurance, banking, or securities." 61 The Court then considered the effect of
the so-called deemer clause, section 514(b)(2)(B):
Neither an employee benefit plan... nor any trust established under such a
plan, shall be deemed to be an insurance company or other insurer, bank, trust
company, or investment company or to be engaged in the business of insurance
or banking for purposes of any law of any State purporting to regulate
insurance companies, insurance contracts, banks, trust companies, or
investment companies.62
The Court read the deemer clause to exempt self-funded ERISA plans from
state laws that regulate insurance within the meaning of the saving clause.63
"Our decision," the Court acknowledged, "'results in a distinction between
insured and uninsured plans, leaving the former open to indirect regulation
57 498 U.S. 52 (1990). For a careful analysis of Holliday, see James R. Bruner, Note,
AIDS and ERISA Preemption: The Double Threat, 41 DuKE LJ. 1115, 1132-56 (1992).5 8 HoIliday, 498 U.S. at 54.
59 See supra note 17.
60 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a).
61 Id. § 1144(b)(2)(A).
62 1d. § 1144(b)(2)(B).
63 Holliday, 498 U.S. at 61.
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while the latter are not.'" 64 In dissent, Justice Stevens said: "The Court's
construction of the statute draws a broad and illogical distinction between
benefit plans that are funded by the employer (self-insured plans) and those that
are insured by regulated insurance companies (insured plans)." 65 Justice
Stevens offered an alternate reading of the deemer clause that would not
preempt the state statute. 66
Both the majority's and the dissent's readings of the deemer clause have
been criticized, 67 but congressional action seems required to alter the effect of
Holliday.68 As the law stands following Holliday, employers can avoid any
state insurance regulation by changing from insurance-based health plans to
self-insured health plans. As one commentator has observed: "ERISA, adopted
almost twenty years ago to protect employees, now allows employers to enter
what is, in effect, a regulation-free zone." 69 The implications of the current
64 Id. at 62 (quoting Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 747
(1985)).
65 Id. at 65 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
66 Id. at 72 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
67 See, e.g., Bruner, supra note 57, at 1144-48. Bruner suggests: "[A] more plausible
interpretation of the deemer clause is that it prohibits states from regulating ERISA plans
through any pretextual laws.... [Jihe deemer clause should be interpreted to preempt all
laws that merely purport to regulate insurance companies or insurance contracts, but are, in
fact, aimed at something else." Id. at 1153.
68 The nation's state insurance commissioners have recently called for amendment of
ERISA to permit them to monitor the financial condition and claims practices of self-insured
employers. See Robert Pear, State Regulators Seek Power over Self-Insured Employers,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 1994, at B7. The National Association of Insurance Commissioners,
which represents insurance regulators from the fifty states, said that people in self-insured
health care plans "'enjoy fewer protections'" than people with health care plans subject to
state regulation. Id. Fred C. Nepple, chief counsel for the Wisconsin Insurance Department,
said:
Under Erisa ... there is no regulatory process to deal with unfair claims decisions or
managed care practices. The administrators of these plans know we cannot audit them
or review their files to see if there is a pattern of inappropriate denial of claims. We try
to mediate, but have no authority.
Id.
69 Alan I. Widiss & Larry Gostin, Wat's Wrong with the ERISA "Vacuum"?: The
Case Against Unrestricted Freedom for Employers to Terminate Employee Health Care
Plans and to Decide What Coverage Is To Be Provided When Risk Retention Plans Are
Established for Health Care, 41 DRAK L. Rnv. 635, 654-55 (1992); see also Julie K.
Swedback, Note, The Deemer Cause: A Legislative Savior for Self-Funded Health
Insurance Plans Under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 18 WM.
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state of the law were dramatically underscored in McGann v. H & H Music
Co. 70 In that case, shortly after learning that an employee was being treated for
AIDS, an employer changed from an insured health care plan to a self-insured
plan and reduced the lifetime maximum benefits for AIDS-related claims from
$1,000,000 to $5,000. All the state law claims were dismissed by the trial
court, and dismissal of the discrimination claims under ERISA was upheld on
appeal. 71
D. Preemption of Remedies Against Wrongful Utilization Review
Practices
The effort to contain health care costs has led employers and insurers to
develop aggressive utilization review procedures. 72 Utilization review involves
the evaluation by an insurer, self-insured plan, or contracting agent of the
appropriateness of medical treatment recommended by an attending or treating
physician. 73 ERISA has been held to preempt state law remedies for negligent
or abusive utilization review procedures. In Corcoran v. United HealthCare,
Inc.,74 for example, the court held that ERISA preempted a medical
MrrcHELL L. RLy. 757 (1992).
70 946 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 482 (1992).
71 Id. at 404-08. For a careful analysis of the threat to sound health care policy from
cases like McCann, see Widiss & Gostin, supra note 69. Claims similar to those presented
in McGann may be raised under the Americans with Disabilities Act. See, e.g., Carparts
Distribution Ctr., Inc. v. Automotive Wholesaler's Ass'n of New Eng., Inc., No. 93-1954,
1994 WL 543530 (1st Cir. Oct. 12, 1994). For discussion of the effect of ERISA
preemption on the health care benefits of people with AIDS and discussion of the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission's interim guidelines regarding insurance
discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act, see Kathlynn L. Butler,
Comment, Securing Employee Health Benefits Through ERISA and the ADA, 42 EMORY
LJ. 1197 (1993); Lizzette Palmer, Comment, ERISA Preemption and Its Effects on
Capping the Health Benefits of Individuals with AIDS: A Demonstration of Why the United
States Health and Insurance Systems Require Substantial Reform, 30 Hous. L. REV. 1347
(1993). Laura J. Schacht, Note, The Health Care Crisis: Improving Access for Employees
Covered by Self-Insured Health Plans Under ERISA and the Americans with Disabilities Act,
45 WAsH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 303 (1994).
72 See supra notes 13-16 and accompanying text. See generally John D. Blum, An
Analysis of Legal Liability in Health Care Utilization Review and Case Management, 26
Hous. L. REV. 191 (1989); Elisabeth Rosenthal, Insurers Second-Guess Doctors, Provoking
Debate over Savings, N.Y. TIEs, Jan. 24, 1993, at Al.
73 See Blum, supra note 72, at 192-93.
74 965 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 812 (1992). For a helpful analysis
of the case, see H.R. Scheel, Recent Development, Corcoran v. United HealthCare, Inc.:
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malpractice action by the parents of an unborn child who died after the
utilization review consultant for a disability plan, over the objection of the
treating physician and another specialist, advised that the mother did not
require bed rest during the final months of her pregnancy. The court, however,
was troubled by the result, which it said "ERISA compels us to reach." 75 The
court noted in particular that ERISA preemption eliminates "an important
check on the thousands of medical decisions routinely made in the burgeoning
utilization review system." 76 In the analysis of one commentator, ERISA
preemption is eliminating deterrence of wrongful utilization review practices. 77
"Under the Supreme Court's interpretation of ERISA remedies and
preemption, the parties who institute aggressive UR programs are becoming
increasingly immune from liability in their efforts to contain costs .... -78
IV. DENIAL OF MAKE-WHOLE RELIEF UNDER ERISA
Because judicial decisions have ruled out claims based on other sources of
law, ERISA-plan participants must look exclusively to ERISA for relief from
improper processing or denial of health care and other employee benefits
claims. Here too, the courts have taken a narrow view of the relief available.
ERISA Preemption of a Louisiana Tort Action, 67 TUL. L. REv. 821 (1993). See also Kuhl
v. Lincoln Nat'l Health Plan of Kan. City, Inc., 999 F.2d 298 (8th Cir. 1993), cert. denied,
114 S. Ct. 694 (1994); Dukes v. United States Health Care Sys. of Pa., Inc., 848 F. Supp.
39 (E.D. Pa. 1994); Ricci v. Gooberman, 840 F. Supp. 316 (D.N.J. 1993).
75 Corcoran, 965 F.2d at 1338.
76 Id.
77 See Kohler, supra note 13, at 1097.
If, under the current law, employers and insurers may raise ERISA preemption
defenses, the legal system will lose its deterrent effect because ERISA's remedial bite is
limited to an assessment for payment of erroneously denied benefits. The courts are
sending a clear message to third party payors that they may employ aggressive UR
practices without much fear of the consequences. If payment of erroneously denied
benefits is the worst possible result, third party payors have little incentive to curb
aggressive UR practices. An employer may negotiate the cheapest deal, reduce the
price of his premiums, and pay the bills of those who complain. An individual injured
in the process is stripped of his traditional common law remedies simply because he is
"fortunate" enough to be the beneficiary of such an employee benefit agreement.
Id. at 1097-98.
78 Id. at 1098. See generally David D. Griner, Note, Paying the Piper: Third-Party
Payor Liability for Medical TreatmentDecisions, 25 GA. L. REv. 861 (1991).
[Vol. 55:723
ERISA HEALTH CARE CLAIMANTS
Section 502(a) of ERISA79 sets forth what the Supreme Court in Pilot Life
called a "comprehensive civil enforcement scheme." 80 For ERISA participants
or beneficiaries, three subsections of section 502(a) provide the principal means
for enforcement of their rights under ERISA plans. These subsections provide
for recovery of benefits due, 81 remedies to protect a plan, 82 and "other
appropriate equitable relief."83
A. Recovery of Benefits Due
Section 502(a)(1)(B) provides that a participant or beneficiary may bring a
civil action "to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan, to
enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future
benefits under the terms of the plan. " 84 This provision is the basis for suits by
ERISA-plan claimants to recover "benefits due" from a benefits plan; however,
on its face, the provision limits recovery to the amount of benefits wrongfully
withheld, and this limitation has been upheld in actions seeking compensatory
and punitive damages.8 5 Thus, this provision fails to provide any remedy for
unreasonable delay, wrongful benefits denial, fraud, malice, or resulting harm
to participants or beneficiaries.
B. Remedies to Protect a Plan
Section 502(a)(2) 86 provides that a participant or beneficiary (in addition to
the Secretary of Labor or an ERISA-plan fiduciary) may bring an action for
"appropriate relief" under section 409.87 Section 409 provides that an ERISA-
plan fiduciary who breaches any obligation under the Act "shall be personally
liable to make good to such plan" any resulting losses and to restore to the plan
any profits made through use of plan assets, and "shall be subject to such other
79 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a).
80 Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 54 (1987).
81 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B).
82 Id. § 1132(a)(2).
83 Id. § 1132(a)(3). Other subsections of § 502(a) empower participants or
beneficiaries to bring actions for failures to provide required information. See id.
§§ 1132(a)(1)(A), (a)(4).
84 Id. § 1132(a)(1)(B).
85 See, e.g., Harsch v. Eisenberg, 956 F.2d 651, 654-56, 660-61 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 61 (1992).
86 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2).
87 Id. § 1109.
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equitable or remedial relief as the court may deem appropriate." 88 The scope of
this section was addressed by the Supreme Court in Massachusetts Mutual Life
Insurance Co. v. Russell.8 9
In Russell, the claimant sought compensatory and punitive damages for
improper and untimely processing of a disability claim. The Court unanimously
held that such damages were not available under section 502(a)(2) to enforce
section 409 because section 409 was intended to provide remedies to protect the
entire plan rather than the rights of individual beneficiaries. 90 Because the
claimant relied exclusively on section 409, the Court had "no occasion to
consider whether any other provision of ERISA authorizes recovery of
extracontractual damages." 91 However, Justice Stevens, writing for the
majority, went well beyond the narrow holding necessary to decide the case
and suggested a general unavailability of extracontractual damages in actions by
participants or beneficiaries. 92 As discussed in the next Section, Justice
Brennan, joined by Justices White, Marshall, and Blackmun, wrote separately
to emphasize the narrow focus of the Court's holding and to express a quite
different view of the availability of extracontractual damages under other
provisions of the Act.93
C. Action for "Other Appropriate Equitable Relief'
Section 502(a)(3) provides that a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary may
bring an action "(A) to enjoin any act or practice which violates any provision
of this subchapter or the terms of the plan, or (B) to obtain other appropriate
equitable relief (i) to redress such violations or (ii) to enforce any provisions of
this subchapter or the terms of the plan." 94 The meaning of this provision has
stirred considerable debate, but as currently construed, it has offered little in
the way of additional remedies to ERISA-plan claimants.
The differing views of the scope of section 502(a)(3) initially were
suggested in Russell by the majority opinion of Justice Stevens and the
concurring opinion of Justice Brennan. The question is whether a plaintiff's
right "to obtain other appropriate equitable relief to redress [violations of
88 Id.
89 473 U.S. 134 (1985).
90 Id. at 142.
9 1 Id. at 139 n.5. Extracontractual damages mean "damages other than the payment of
benefits owed under a plan." Howe v. Varity Corp., 36 F.3d 746, 754 (8th Cir. 1994).92 See Russell, 473 U.S. at 146-48.
93 See id. at 148-58 (Brennan, J., concurring).
94 29 U.S.C § 1132(a)(3).
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ERISA or an ERISA plan]" 95 empowers a court to fashion remedies beyond
those expressly identified in section 502(a). In dicta that has had significant
influence, Justice Stevens stated: "The six carefully integrated civil
enforcement provisions found in § 502(a)... provide strong evidence that
Congress did not intend to authorize other remedies that it simply forgot to
incorporate expressly." 96 Justice Stevens found "a stark absence" in the statute
itself and in its legislative history of any indication that Congress intended to
authorize the recovery of extracontractual damages. 97
Justice Brennan pointedly disagreed, saying:
[The Court's remarks about the constrictive judicial role in enforcing ERISA's
remedial scheme are inaccurate insofar as Congress provided in § 502(a)(3)
that beneficiaries could recover, in addition to the remedies explicitly set forth
in that section, "other appropriate equitable relief ... to redress" ERISA
violations. Congress already had instructed that beneficiaries could recover
benefits, obtain broad injunctive and declaratory relief for their own personal
benefit or for the benefit of their plans, and secure attorney's fees, so this
additional provision can only be read precisely as authorizing federal courts to
"fine-tune" ERISA's remedial scheme. 98
Justice Brennan found from the legislative history that Congress intended
federal courts "to develop federal common law in fashioning the additional
'appropriate equitable relief '" 99 and that Congress intended to engraft trust-law
principles into the ERISA enforcement scheme.1°° He noted that trust-law
95 Id. § 1132(a)(3)(B)Ci).
9 6 Russell, 473 U.S. at 146.
97 Id. at 148.
98 Id. at 155 (Brennan, I., concurring).
9 9 Id. at 156 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan cited the statement of Senator
Javits, one of the two principal Senate sponsors of ERISA, that it was "intended that a body
of Federal substantive law will be developed by the courts to deal with issues involving
rights and obligations under private welfare and pension plans." Id. (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (quoting 120 CONG. REc. 29,942 (1974)). He also quoted Senator Williams, the
Act's other principal Senate sponsor, as emphasizing "that suits involving beneficiaries'
rights 'will be regarded as arising under the laws of the United States, in similar fashion to
those brought under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act.'" Id. (Brennan,
I., concurring) (quoting 120 CONG. REc. 29,933 (1974)). He added: "Section 301, of
course, 'authorizes federal courts to fashion a body of federal law'.., to be derived by
'looking at the policy of the legislation and fashioning a remedy that will effectuate that
policy.'" Id. (Brennan, I., concurring) (quoting Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S.
448, 451 (1957)).100 Id at 156-57 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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remedies are equitable in nature and include monetary damages. 101 Later
Supreme Court cases have suggested that the courts are to develop a federal
common law of rights and obligations under ERISA, 1° 2 and commentators
have suggested that the language of section 502(a)(3) is compatible with trust-
law damages principles that afford make-whole relief.10 3 Moreover, a 1989
congressional report expressed the view that the legislative history of ERISA
makes clear that Congress intended the courts to develop federal common law
with respect to benefits plans, including appropriate remedies, even if they are
not specifically mentioned in section 502(a). 104 With limited exceptions,
however, the courts have declined to fashion federal common law remedies. 10 5
Faced with claims for a variety of damages in addition to benefits due
under the terms of ERISA plans, the appellate courts ruling after Russell
virtually without exception refused to award any form of consequential,
compensatory, extracontractual, or punitive damages. In Sokol v. Bernstein,1°6
an early and frequently cited decision, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
rejected a claim for damages to compensate emotional distress caused by
arbitrary and capricious acts by an ERISA-plan trustee. After reviewing the
101 Id. at 154 n.10 (Brennan, J., concurring).
102 See, e.g., Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 110 (1989); Pilot
Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 56 (1987).
103 See, e.g., Diane M. Sumoski, Note, Participant and Beneficiary Remedies Under
ERISA: Extracontractual and Punitive Damages After Massachusetts Mutual life Ins. Co. v.
Russell, 71 CORNELL L. REv. 1014, 1027-36 (1986).
104 H.R. REP. No. 247, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 55-56 (1989). The report said:
In cases in which... facts and circumstances show that the processing of legitimate
benefit claims has been unreasonably delayed or totally disregarded by an insurer, an
employer, a plan administrator, or a plan, the Committee intends the Federal courts to
develop a Federal common law of remedies ... including such remedies as the
awarding of punitive and/or compensatory damages against the person responsible for
the failure to pay claims in a timely manner.
Id. at 56.
105 See Carr & iebross, supra note 5, at 222-23. "All too often, the courts apply
ERISA's minimum standards as though they are maximum standards and repeatedly fail to
carry out their mandate to create appropriate rules of federal common law to provide
remedies for obvious injustices." Id. For a careful discussion of the limited federal common
law developed under ERISA and an exhortation that the courts "seize the opportunity to fill
in ERISA's gaps," see Jayne E. Zanglein, Closing the Gap: Safeguarding Parnicipants'
Rights by Expanding the Federal Common Law of ERISA, 72 WAsH. U. L.Q. 671 (1994).
"Absent further congressional enactments, federal courts are the only protectors of
participants who have been 'betrayed without a remedy.'" Id. at 723.
106 803 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1986).
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difference of view between Justice Stevens and Justice Brennan in Russell, the
court stated: "We hold that because of the rationale of Russell, and because of
ERISA's structure and legislative history, § 502(a)(3) makes no provision for
extracontractual damages, including damages for emotional distress." 107
Similarly, in McRae v. Seafarers' Welfare Plan,10 8 the Eleventh Circuit Court
of Appeals rejected claims for compensatory and consequential damages,
including damages for emotional distress, humiliation, and injury to financial
reputation based upon an ERISA plan's refusal to pay medical bills for a
surgical procedure initially approved by the plan but then denied retroactively.
Saying that Russell "has provided the framework and the guidelines for us to
use in making this decision," 1°9 the court held that extracontractual damages
are not available under section 502(a)(3).110
In fact, the only circuit court case since Russell that has allowed
extracontractual damages under section 502(a)(3) is Warren v. Society National
Bank,111 a narrow ruling in which the court permitted the plaintiff to seek
monetary damages based on an ERISA-plan trustee's alleged failure to transfer
assets properly, thereby causing a tax loss. 12 The panel majority attempted to
distinguish the case from cases in which plaintiffs sought punitive or
compensatory damages for consequential injuries such as emotional distress,
saying that the decision "does not necessarily put us in conflict with the
holdings of other courts of appeal that have disallowed extracontractual
damages under section 502(a)(3)." 113 However, a dissenting judge noted that
the majority did not cite a single ERISA case holding that extracontractual
compensatory damages were recoverable under section 502(a)(3). 114
The Supreme Court, in Mertens v. Hewitt Associates,115 has resolved
negatively any question regarding the availability of extracontractual damages,
107 Id. at 538.
108 920 F.2d 819 (11th Cir. 1991).
109 Id. at 821.
110 Id.; see also Corcoran v. United HealthCare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 812 (1992); Novak v. Andersen Corp., 962 F.2d 757 (8th Cir. 1992),
cer. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2928 (1993); Harsch v. Eisenberg, 956 F.2d 651 (7th Cir.), ceit.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 61 (1992); Drinkwater v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 846 F.2d 821 (1st
Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 909 (1988); Bishop v. Osborn Transp., Inc., 838 F.2d 1173
(11th Cir.), cet. denied, 488 U.S. 832 (1988); Powell v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co.
of Va., 780 F.2d 419 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1170 (1986).
111 905 F.2d 975 (6th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 952 (1991).
112 ld. at 982.
113 Id.
114 Id. at 985 (Wellford, J., dissenting).
115 113 S. Ct. 2063 (1993).
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albeit by a five to four margin.1 6 In an opinion by Justice Scalia, the majority
in Mertens held that "appropriate equitable relief" in section 502(a)(3) is
limited to remedies that were "typically available in equity (such as injunction,
mandamus, and restitution, but not compensatory damages)." 11 7 According to
the majority, reading the statute differently would render the word "equitable"
superfluous.118
Justice White, joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Stevens and
O'Connor, dissented, urging that equitable remedies available to a trust
beneficiary traditionally included compensatory damages and that section
502(a)(3)'s reference to "appropriate equitable relief' encompassed "what was
equity's routine remedy for such breaches-a compensatory monetary award
calculated to make the victims whole." 119 The dissent also noted that
construing the statute in this manner avoided the anomaly of interpreting
ERISA so as to leave those whom Congress set out to protect with less
protection than they enjoyed before ERISA was enacted. 120
Section 502(a)(3)(B) allows an action "to obtain other appropriate equitable
relief to redress [any act or practice which violates any provision of this
subchapter or the terms of the plan]." 121 The construction given to this section
by the courts denying that it authorizes extracontractual remedies either
deprives section 502(a)(3)(B) of any meaning or renders it duplicative. 122 Most
courts, and now the Supreme Court in Mertens, have concluded that "other
appropriate equitable relief" means "what it usually means-declaratory or
injunctive relief." 123 But, as Justice Brennan made clear in Russell, Congress
116 Mertens concerned a claim against a nonfiduciary, but its holding would seem
equally applicable to claims against fiduciaries such as benefits plan administrators. For an
analysis of the impact of Mertens, see Steuart H. Thomsen & W. Mark Smith, The
Implications of Mertens v. Hewitt Associates for Future ERISA Litigation, 29 ToRT & INS.
L.J 129 (1993); Richard Rouco, Comment, Available Remedies Under ERISA Section
502(a), 45 ALA. L. REv. 631, 656-68 (1994).117 Mertens, 113 S. Ct. at 2069.
llS Id.
119 Id. at 2074 (White, L, dissenting).
120 Id. (White, I., dissenting).
121 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3)(B)(i) (emphasis added).
122 For a carefully reasoned development of this view, see Reid v. Gruntal & Co., 763
F. Supp. 672 (D. Me. 1991). As the court said: "The challenge of section 1132(a)(3)
[§ 502(a)(3) of ERISA] is to ascertain how that provision is different from the other
remedial provisions of section 1132(a)." Id. at 677. In Reid, the court found that claims of
promissory estoppel were included among the causes of action permitted under § 502(a)(3)
and held that consequential damages were available. ld. at 678-79.
123 Novak v. Andersen Corp., 962 F.2d 757, 760 (8th Cir. 1992); Sokol v. Bernstein,
803 F.2d 532, 538 (9th Cir. 1986).
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authorized broad declaratory and injunctive relief elsewhere in section 502(a).
In Justice Brennan's view, section 502(a)(3) must be read as authorizing other
relief. 124 He outlined in Russell the contours of the relief that courts should
allow and the principles that should guide them in fashioning such relief.25
In Howe v. Varity Corp.,126 an important recent case, the court expressed
agreement with Justice Brennan's reasoning in Russell.'27 In Howe, the court
endeavored to fashion a remedy for conduct by ERISA-plan fiduciaries that was
"'nothing more than a brilliant manipulative effort'" to relieve a financially
strapped company of burdensome retiree benefits obligations. 128 The court held
that the plaintiffs, who had proven the defendants' breach of fiduciary duty
under an ERISA plan, were entitled to monetary relief "in the nature of
restitution to compensate them for benefits of which.., they had been
deprived." 129 The monetary relief that the court approved apparently included
not only the value of benefits that the plaintiffs had been denied under the plan,
but also amounts spent by the plaintiffs for replacement health insurance
policies when their plan benefits ceased. 130 However, in defining the relief
available under section 502(a)(3), the court was clearly constrained by Mertens
and other narrow ERISA precedents. Citing Mertens and Novak v. Andersen
Corp.,131 the court reversed judgments for compensatory damages. 132
Moreover, although the court called the defendants' conduct "egregious" and
approved the finding of the district court that "[d]efendants' conduct ... was
willful, wanton, malicious, and in bad faith,"'133 the court denied the
availability of punitive damages, stating: "Only equitable relief, as opposed to
damages, is available under ERISA, and punitive damages are not, by any
stretch of the imagination, equitable relief." 134
Cases like Howe may slightly enlarge the limits of "other appropriate
equitable relief" under section 502(a)(3). However, the Supreme Court in
124 Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 155 (1985) (Brennan,
I., concurring).
125 Id. at 157-58 (Brennan, J. concurring).
126 36 F.3d 746 (8th Cir. 1994).
127 Id. at 755.
128 Id. (quoting district court).
129 Id. at 756.
130 Id. at 757 (Hansen, J., dissenting). The dissenting judge said: "I have great
difficulty in seeing those sums as 'restitution.' To me they are traditional consequential legal
damages and unrecoverable under § 1132(a)(3)." Id. (Hansen, I., dissenting).
131 962 F.2d 757 (8th Cir. 1992).
132 Howe, 36 F.3d at 756.
133 It at 755. The district court also found that the defendants' conduct was "'just
such a maneuver'" as ERISA was enacted to prevent. Id.
134 Id. at 752 (citation omitted).
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Mertens and virtually all other courts have rejected Justice Brennan's argument
that section 502(a)(3) should be read as "authorizing federal courts to 'fine-
tune' ERISA's remedial scheme." 135 Therefore, ERISA claimants are left
without a basis for seeking any form of consequential, compensatory, or
punitive damages, whether in actions based on state law or in actions under
ERISA. No matter what delays or abuses they may suffer and no matter how
harmful the consequences may be, ERISA claimants must content themselves
with recovery solely of the amount of benefits originally due.
V. STANDARD AND SCOPE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS: DE Novo OR
JUDICIAL DEFERENCE TO DEFENDANTS?
Not only have the courts systematically narrowed and diminished the
remedies available to ERISA-plan claimants, they have also established a
standard of review and often limited the scope of review in ways inconsistent
with the language and the purposes of ERISA.
A. Standard of Review
Conflict of interest almost always exists between ERISA benefits plans and
benefits claimants. Incongruously, and with little regard for the language of
ERISA, the courts initially adopted the arbitrary-and-capricious rule as the
appropriate standard for review of benefits decisions by ERISA plan
administrators. This made little sense, but the courts' more fundamental error,
as discussed later, 136 was treating claimants' actions for benefits as judicial
review proceedings.
1. Standard Adopted from LMRA Cases
ERISA does not set out a standard for judicial review of decisions by plan
administrators. 137 In early ERISA cases, courts borrowed the arbitrary-and-
capricious standard of review from cases reviewing decisions by administrators
of pension plans set up under section 302(c)(5) 138 of the Labor Management
Relations Act (LMRA).13 9 When borrowing the LMRA standard of review,
135 Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 155 (1985) (Brennan,
J., concurring).
136 See infra part V.A.3.
137 Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 108-09 (1989).
138 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5) (1988).
139 See, e.g., Bruch, 489 U.S. at 109; Van Boxel v. Journal Co. Employees' Pension
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however, courts failed to account for a significant difference between LMRA
plans and ERISA plans. In LMRA plans, which are joint employer-employee
plans, the impartiality of the administrator has been assured, 140 and judicial
deference to the administrator's decision makes sense. In ERISA plans, by
contrast, because the impartiality of the administrator is not assured, there is no
basis for deference to the administrator's decision. As one court stated: "[The
arbitrary-and-capricious] standard was taken over for use in reviewing benefit
denials under ERISA... apparently without the courts' noticing that
employers often held the whip hand in ERISA trusts as they did not with the
joint employer-union trust funds authorized by [the LMRA]." 141
2. Firestone v. Bruch: De Novo or Abuse ofDiscretion?
Courts employed the arbitrary-and-capricious standard in ERISA cases
virtually without exception until the Supreme Court addressed the matter in
Firestone ire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch.142 Bruch concerned the denial of
severance pay benefits to a group of employees by Firestone, which was the
administrator of an unfunded severance pay plan governed by ERISA. 143 The
district court granted Firestone's motion for summary judgment, holding that
Firestone's denial of severance pay was not arbitrary or capricious. 144 The
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed, holding that when the
employer is itself the administrator of an unfunded benefits plan, deference to
Trust, 836 F.2d 1048, 1052 (7th Cir. 1987).
140 LMRA plans are joint employer-employee plans, with employers and employees
equally represented in the administration of the plans, and with disputes resolved by
neutrals. See 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5).
141 Van Boxel, 836 F.2d at 1052.
142 489 U.S. 101 (1989). For a useful analysis of pre-Bruch decisions, see George L.
Flint, Jr., ERISA: The Arbitrary and Capricious Rule Under Siege, 39 CATH. U. L. REv.
133 (1989). Before and after Bruch, the courts have employed differing terms for the
deferential standard of review. Some courts equate the arbitrary-and-capricious and abuse-
of-discretion standards; other courts distinguish them. See, e.g., Kotrosits v. GATX Corp.
Non-Contributory Pension Plan for Salaried Employees, 757 F. Supp. 1434, 1453 n.6
(E.D. Pa. 1991). Fine distinctions between the different formulations of deferential review
are not meaningful. What is important is the difference between deferential review and
nondeferential de novo review. See, e.g., Van Boxel v. Journal Co. Employees' Pension
Trust, 836 F.2d 1048, 1052 (7th Cir. 1987).
143 Bruch v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 640 F. Supp. 519, 520-22 (E.D. Pa.
1986), affid in part and rev'd in part, 828 F.2d 134 (3d Cir. 1987), aff'd in part and rev'd
inpart, 489 U.S. 101 (1989).
144 Id. at 521-26.
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its decision is unwarranted because there is no assurance of impartiality. 145 The
court concluded that the proper standard of review was de novo. 146 The
Supreme Court agreed that de novo review was the proper standard of review
but based its holding on a different analysis.147
Limiting its discussion to the proper standard of review for actions
challenging benefits eligibility determinations under section 502(a)(1)(B) of
ERISA, 148 the Court first considered the application to ERISA of the arbitrary-
and-capricious standard developed under the LMRA and concluded "that the
wholesale importation of the arbitrary and capricious standard into ERISA is
unwarranted." 149 The Court then held that "a denial of benefits challenged
under § 1132(a)(1)(B) is to be reviewed under a de novo standard unless the
benefit plan gives the administrator or fiduciary discretionary authority to
determine eligibility for benefits or to construe the terms of the plan." 50 The
Court focused not, as the court of appeals had, on the conflict of interest or
lack of impartiality on the part of the plan administrator, but simply on whether
the plan gave the administrator discretionary authority.' 51 Noting that "ERISA
abounds with the language and terminology of trust law,"' 52 the Court stated:
"Trust principles make a deferential standard of review appropriate when a
trustee exercises discretionary powers.' 53
Although Bruch requires de novo review of administrators' decisions in
benefits plans that lack a grant of discretionary authority, the ruling serves
primarily as an explicit instruction for plan administrators who wish to assure
themselves of deferential judicial review. They need only amend their benefits
plans to include comprehensive grants of discretionary authority. 154
145 Bruch, 828 F.2d at 152-53.
146 Id. at 137-45.
14 7 Bruch, 489 U.S. at 108-15.
148 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B).
149 Bruch, 489 U.S. at 109.
15 0 Id. at 115.
151 See id.
152 Id. at 110.
153 Id. at 111. "Where discretion is conferred upon the trustee with respect to the
exercise of a power, its exercise is not subject to control by the court except to prevent an
abuse by the trustee of his discretion." Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS
§ 187 (1959)). The Court also said: "'[W]hen trustees are in existence, and capable of
acting, a court of equity will not interfere to control them in the exercise of a discretion
vested in them by the instmwnent under which they act.'" Id. (quoting Nichols v. Eaton, 91
U.S. 716, 724-25 (1875)).
154 See, e.g., Michael S. Beaver, The Standard of Review in ERISA Benefits Denial
Cases After Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v. Bruch: Revolution or D& Vu?, 26 TORT &
INS. L.. 1, 1 (1990).
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By holding that deferential review of ERISA benefits decisions turns on the
particular language of a plan rather than questions of conflict of interest, bias,
and lack of impartiality on the part of the plan administrator, Bruch seriously
undermined the purpose of ERISA even as the Court affirmed that ERISA was
intended "'to promote the interests of employees and their beneficiaries in
employee benefit plans.'" 155
The relationship between a benefits claimant and a benefits plan
administrator is not a neutral relationship. With very few exceptions, the plan
administrator-whether the employer itself, a retained administrator of an
employer-funded plan, or an insurance company-will have a financial interest
in curtailing the payment of benefits, an interest often heightened in the current
cost-conscious climate. The plan administrator will also typically have both
knowledge of the plan's terms and experience in developing claims under the
plan far greater than that of a claimant. The plan administrator often will have
the assistance of a medical department or a legal department, with skilled
professionals available to aid in documenting denial of a claim. From the
outset, a claimant is at a distinct disadvantage in developing a claim.
Judicial deference to the decision of a plan administrator sharply increases
a claimant's disadvantage. Because the court will consider only evidence that
was brought before the administrator at the time of the administrator's decision,
the claimant's lack of experience in developing a complete claim record can
become pivotal. Because the court will give deference to the administrator's
decision if it is supported by substantial evidence, the decision will not be
reversed even if a preponderance of evidence supports a contrary conclusion.
Because the court will give deference to the administrator's decision if it is
reasonable, the administrator's skill in documenting the basis for a decision
may determine the outcome. 156
In deciding whether review of a benefits denial decision should be de novo
or should give deference to the administrator's decision, the Court in Bruch
155 Bruch, 489 U.S. at 113 (quoting Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 90
(1983)).
156 The deferential standard has been applied in countless cases, almost always with
negative results for claimants. See, e.g., Sheppard & Enoch Pratt Hosp., Inc. v. Travelers
Ins. Co., 32 F.3d 120 (4th Cir. 1994); Taft v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 9 F.3d 1469
(9th Cir. 1993); Abnathya v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 2 F.3d 40 (3d Cir. 1993); Sandoval
v. Aetna Life & Casualty Ins. Co., 967 F.2d 377 (10th Cir. 1992); Jett v. Blue Cross &
Blue Shield of Ala., Inc., 890 F.2d 1137 (11th Cir. 1989); Reilly v. Blue Cross & Blue
Shield United of Wis., 846 F.2d 416, 420 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 856 (1988).
For a survey of post-Bruch decisions, see Noel C. Capps, Note, Firestone Tire & Rubber
Co. v. Bruch: Are Lower Courts Following the United States Supreme Court Decision in
ERISA Benefit Deteninations?, 31 WASHBURN L.. 280 (1992).
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pointedly declined to rest its decision on the concern for impartiality that had
guided the court of appeals. 157 Instead, the Court suggested only that conflict
of interest "must be weighed as a 'facto[r] in determining whether there is an
abuse of discretion.'" 58 In the view of one commentator, relegating
consideration of conflict of interest to "a subsidiary analysis within the
framework of a deferential standard of review" has left the courts "free to give
little or no weight to the existence of a conflict of interest in determining
whether the administrator has acted reasonably." 159 As this commentator
suggests, the existence of conflict of interest "is arguably a more compelling
focus for determining the appropriate standard of review to be applied in denial
of benefit cases." 160
Deference to decisions of plan administrators also enlarges the potential for
unfairness in judicial review of retrospective denials of health care claims. At
the time medical care is being given, most patients have little option but to
follow the recommendations of their physicians. Patients and their physicians
must make treatment decisions prospectively, often facing uncertainties about
the nature of a medical problem, the appropriateness of particular diagnostic
procedures, the best course of treatment, the length of time necessary for
recovery, and the like. Claims for reimbursement, however, are generally
reviewed retrospectively, 161 and such claims may be denied, after the fact, by
157 See Bruch, 489 U.S. at 115.
158 ld. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 187, cmt. d (1959)). One court
has attempted to develop "a coherent method for integrating factors such as self-interest into
the legal standard for reviewing benefits determinations." Brown v. Blue Cross & Blue
Shield of Ala., Inc., 898 F.2d 1556, 1561 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1040
(1991). Noting that the fiduciary role of an insurance company "lies in perpetual conflict
with its profit-making role as a business," id., the court attempted to develop a framework
within which application of the arbitrary-and-capricious standard of review is "shaped by
the circumstances of the inherent conflict of interest." Id. at 1563. The court held:
[When a plan beneficiary demonstrates a substantial conflict of interest on the part of
the fiduciary responsible for benefits determinations, the burden shills to the fiduciary to
prove that its interpretation of plan provisions committed to its discretion was not tainted
by self-interest. That is, a wrong but apparently reasonable interpretation is arbitrary
and capricious if it advances the conflicting interest of the fiduciary at the expense of the
affected beneficiary or beneficiaries unless the fiduciary justifies the interpretation on
the ground of its benefit to the class of all participants and beneficiaries.
Id. at 1566-67 (footnote omitted).
159 W. Douglas Holdren, Comment, Denial of Benefit Claims Under ERISA: 7h Rise
and Fall of De Novo Review, 36 VILL. L. REV. 1219, 1234 (1991).
160 Id.
161 See, e.g., Richard M. Scheffler et al., The Impact of Blue Cross and Blue Shield
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plan administrators concerned more about cost containment or standardized
treatment norms than about the needs of particular patients. Retrospective
review is inherently disadvantageous for health care claimants, and judicial
deference to claim denials based on retrospective review unreasonably increases
this disadvantage.
3. An Action for Benefits, Not a Review Proceeding
One commentator has cogently argued that the Supreme Court's
fundamental error in Bruch was treating actions for benefits under section
502(a)(1)(B) 162 of ERISA not as actions for benefits but as review
proceedings.1 63 By its terms, section 502(a)(1)(B) does not establish a review
procedure but a right of action: "A civil action may be brought... by a
participant or beneficiary... to recover benefits due to him under the terms of
his plan, to enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his
rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan .... " 164 The language of
this provision might helpfully be compared to the very different language
Congress has employed when establishing judicial review procedures.' 65
Section 502(a)(1)(B) permits a claimant to bring a civil action to recover
benefits due, to enforce rights under a plan, or to clarify rights to future
benefits.' 66 By contrast, for example, the Social Security Act permits a
claimant to bring a civil action to obtain review of any final decision of the
Secretary. 167 The type of proceeding plainly intended by the language of
section 502(a)(1)(B) is a plenary action for determination of facts and rights,
not a review proceeding for correction of errors below.' 68 Only in review
proceedings would deference to prior decisionmaking have any place. Yet in
virtually all actions under section 502(a)(1)(B), the courts speak and act as
though they were engaged in judicial review of administrative decisionmaking.
In doing so, they regularly presume that deference should be given to the
Plan Utilization Management Programs, 1980-88, 28 INQUIRY 263, 266 (1991); Griner,
supra note 78, at 884.
162 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B).
163 See Jay Conison, Sits for Benefits Under ERISA, 54 U. Prrr. L. REv. 1, 57-58
(1992).
164 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B).
165 See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-06 (1988) (judicial review of decisions under the
Administrative Procedure Act); 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1988) (Oudicial review of decisions
under the Social Security Act).
166 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B).
167 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
168 See Conison, supra note 163, at 57-58.
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decisions of the employers, insurers, or plan administrators that have denied
benefits and stand to gain from having done so. Presuming that deferential
review should be accorded under such circumstances "has no tenable
foundation." 169 In ERISA actions for benefits, "[tihe rule of deferential
review... serves no apparent function other than to impede protection of
employee benefit rights." 170 In section 502(a)(1)(B), Congress gave ERISA
claimants a full-fledged remedy; by treating section 502(a)(1)(B) as providing
for judicial review, the courts have taken claimants' remedy away.
4. Review of Factual Detenninations
Since the decision of the Supreme Court in Bruch, disagreement has
developed in the courts of appeals concerning the standard of review to be
applied when decisions by ERISA-plan administrators turn on questions of fact
rather than on interpretations of terms of the plans. 171 In Pierre v. Connecticut
General Life Insurance Co.,172 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals read Bruch
as addressing only the standard of review in actions based on plan term
interpretations, and held that for all factual determinations under ERISA plans,
the abuse of discretion standard should apply.173 Commenting that deference is
169 Id. at 34.
170 Id. at 60.
The rule of deferential review is an anachronism. It is an artifact of a different
legal framework and it serves no apparent function other than to impede protection of
employee benefit rights. Courts persist in adhering to it, not for good and thoughtful
reasons, but simply because courts in prior cases adhered to it-still without good and
thoughtful reasons.
Id.
171 Compare Luby v. Teamsters Health, Welfare, & Pension Trust Funds, 944 F.2d
1176 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding that de novo standard of review, which is required when an
ERISA plan does not grant discretionary authority to plan administrator, extends to
decisions based on purely factual questions) with Pierre v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins.
Co./Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 932 F.2d 1552 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 453 (1991)
(holding that abuse-of-discretion standard rather than de novo standard applies to review of
decisions based upon factual determinations).
172 932 F.2d 1552 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 453 (1991).
173 Id. at 1562. Other courts have held similarly that ERISA-plan administrators'
factual determinations are to be reviewed deferentially rather than de novo. See, e.g.,
Barish v. United Mine Workers Health & Retirement Fund, 753 F. Supp. 165, 168-69
(W.D. Pa. 1990); Questech, Inc. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 713 F. Supp. 956,
962-63 (E.D. Va. 1989). Some courts have applied a de novo standard of review to
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given to the factfinder in virtually all decisional review, the court said: "We see
no reason here why the plan administrator, i.e., the trier of fact, should be
placed in a different status." 174 The court also suggested that considerations of
expediency support deference to factual determinations made by plan
administrators. "The courts simply cannot supplant plan administrators,
through de novo review, as resolvers of mundane and routine fact disputes." 175
The approach taken by the court in Pierre significantly reduces the
availability of de novo review in ERISA-plan benefits cases. Claims for
medical care, disability benefits, or life insurance benefits frequently turn on
factual determinations that, far from being "mundane and routine," go to the
heart of the controversy. Questions regarding medical necessity, medical
causation, preexisting condition, cause of death, and the like are factual
questions that are often much more important in the resolution of ERISA
benefits claims than the construction of plan terms. De novo review is
necessary to insure impartial examination of such central factual matters.
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has rejected the Fifth Circuit's
analysis in Pierre. In Luby v. Teamsters Health, Welfare, & Pension Trust
Funds,176 the court disagreed with the notion that ERISA-plan administrators'
factual determinations should be accorded deference, calling attention to the
difference between ERISA-plan administrators and governmental agencies
accorded deferential review because of acknowledged expertise. 177 The court
held that an ERISA-plan administrator's decision based solely on factual
determinations is to be reviewed de novo. The court said its ruling was
consistent with Bruch and its emphasis on the goals of ERISA-to protect the
interests of plan members and their beneficiaries.17 8 With two Justices
dissenting, the Supreme Court declined the opportunity to resolve the conflict
ERISA-plan administrators' factual determinations without addressing whether the Bruch
holding applies to factual determinations as well as interpretations of plan terms. See, e.g.,
Reinking v. Philadelphia Am. Life Ins. Co., 910 F.2d 1210, 1214 (4th Cir. 1990); Brown
v. Ampco-Pittsburgh Corp., 876 F.2d 546, 551 (6th Cir. 1989).
174 Pierre, 932 F.2d at 1559.
175 Id. The court is disingenuous in characterizing as "mundane and routine" the
factual controversies that arise in health care, disability, life insurance, and other ERISA-
plan cases. The factual controversies are often highly complex. See, e.g., Quesinberry v.
Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 987 F.2d 1017 (4th Cir. 1993). Quesinberry was a dispute, not
unusual, regarding an accidental death insurance policy. At trial, medical experts testified at
length about the decedent's underlying condition and the cause of her death. Id. at 1020 &
n. 1. The facts set forth in the opinion make clear that the issues were far from mundane or
routine. See id.
176 944 F.2d 1176 (3d Cir. 1991).
177 Id. at 1183-84.
178 Id. at 1184-85.
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in the courts of appeals on whether courts must accord deference to all factual
determinations by ERISA-plan administrators. 179
B. Scope of Review
Even when Bruch requires de novo review of an ERISA-plan benefits
denial, some courts have limited the scope of review to evidence that was put
before the plan administrator. 180 This limitation was imposed by the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals in Perry v. Simplicity Engineering.18' In Perry, the
court held that the de novo standard of review "does not mandate or permit the
consideration of evidence not presented to the administrator." 182 In the court's
view, Bruch did not require a de novo hearing but only a de novo review of the
administrator's decision.' 8 3 The court feared that if courts received and
considered evidence not presented to plan administrators, courts would become
"substitute plan administrators." 184 In the court's view, such a procedure
would frustrate the goal of prompt and inexpensive resolution of benefits claims
under the ERISA scheme.185
Limiting de novo review to evidence that was presented to the plan
administrator has serious practical consequences for benefits claimants. Many
factors interfere with claimants' opportunities to develop adequate records
before plan administrators. During administrative processing of benefits claims,
claimants will seldom be represented by counsel; plan administrators, on the
other hand, will often have counsel available and will ordinarily delegate the
179 Pierre v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co./Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 112 S. Ct. 453
(1991).
180 See, e.g., Perry v. Simplicity Eng'g, 900 F.2d 963, 966 (6th Cir. 1990); Questech,
Inc. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 713 F. Supp. 956, 962 (E.D. Va. 1989). But see,
e.g., Kirwan v. Marriott Corp., 10 F.3d 784, 789-90 (11th Cir. 1994); Luby v. Teamsters
Health, Welfare, & Pension Trust Funds, 944 F.2d 1176, 1184-85 (3d Cir. 1991); Moon v.
American Home Assurance Co., 888 F.2d 86, 89 (11th Cir. 1989). Courts have also limited
review to evidence before the plan administrator in cases calling for application of the
abuse-of-discretion standard of review. See, e.g., Sandoval v. Aetna Life & Casualty Ins.
Co., 967 F.2d 377, 380-81 (10th Cir. 1992); Woolsey v. Marion Lab., Inc., 934 F.2d
1452, 1460 (10th Cir. 1991).
181 900 F.2d 963 (6th Cir. 1990).
182 Id. at 967. In the words of another court: "[A] curtain falls when the fiduciary
completes its review, and.., the district court must evaluate the record as it was at the
time of the decision." Sandoval v. Aetna Life & Casualty Ins. Co., 967 F.2d 377, 381 (10th
Cir. 1992) (citing Peny).
183 Perry, 900 F.2d at 966.
184 Id.
185 Id. at 966-67.
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development of claims to specialists in claims management or examination.
Consequently, although claims managers will generally know precisely what
issues require development, claimants will often have an incomplete or
uncertain understanding of what the central issues are and what evidence should
be submitted. In addition, claimants are frequently baffled by complicated
claims forms or procedures, but these forms and procedures are the stock-in-
trade of claims managers. Also, during the administrative processing of claims,
claimants' abilities to develop full records are sometimes seriously affected by
the stress and disruption of the illnesses, major medical procedures, or familial
deaths that give rise to their claims. 186
When medical issues must be addressed, claimants' disadvantages are often
exacerbated by the difficulties most lay people experience in trying to procure
adequate medical evidence. A growing number of primary care physicians are
so overburdened by cost-containment procedures or so "fed up
with... second guessing" from administrators that they are unwilling or
unable to supply their patients with any medical documentation.187 Other
186 "Patients and family members, already emotionally strained by the events of a
serious illness, are often helpless to challenge a faceless bureaucracy." Scott R. Severs,
Ensuring the Integrity of the Decision-Making Process May Be Lawyers' Single Biggest
Contribution to Health Care Reform, NAT'L L.J, Feb. 7, 1994, at 35.
187 See Who Shall Be Healed? ('hfiteenlWNET television broadcast, Jan. 27, 1993).
The intensity of many physicians' attitudes towards cost-containment procedures was
revealed in the comments of two physicians-Gilbert Mudge, Jr., M.D., a cardiologist, and
Arnold S. Relman, M.D., Editor in Chief Emeritus of the New England Journal of
Medicine-in the television program Who Shall Be Healed?
GILBERT MUDGE, JR., M.D.: Get the insurance companies out of my
hair.... I didn't go to medical school to spend 40% of my time talking to
nonphysicians on the phone about trivial details that actually have nothing to do with
patient care. I went to medical school to meet patients and to take care of patients.
ARTHUR R. MILLER: He sounds mad.
ARNOLD RELMAN, M.D.: And he's saying what almost every practicing
physician in this country is now saying. And you'd better listen very carefully because
the American medical profession is fed up with the kind of management and second
guessing that they're being subjected to.
Id.; see also i1sa Belkin, Sensing a Loss of Control, More Doctors Call It Quits, N.Y.
Trm, Mar. 9, 1993, at Al, B2.
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treating physicians-pressed for time, certain that a "note from the doctor" will
be sufficient, and disinclined to be drawn into claims disputes-are often
willing to submit only brief, conclusory reports. On the other hand, consultants
retained by claims managers and medical experts employed full-time by plan
administrators are likely to prepare longer, seemingly more reasoned reports,
even though these nontreating consultants may have significantly less
understanding of the relevant medical facts than do treating physicians.
Moreover, regularly employed or frequently retained experts may be biased in
favor of those who employ them.
Finally, during the administrative processing of claims, records before plan
administrators remain under the administrators' control. Claimants do not
generally know what is contained in the records until they become available
through discovery procedures in civil actions; consequently, claimants may not
become aware of the need to present additional evidence until after court
proceedings have commenced.
Developing an adequate evidentiary record in a health care, disability, or
life insurance case is a complex task, one performed poorly by many attorneys,
let alone lay people acting under duress of illness or family loss. The range of
issues that must be assessed and documented is daunting. Extensive knowledge
and skills are necessary to understand the issues and develop a complete
record. 188 Claims handlers employed by insurers and plan administrators have
[Dr. Warren Glaser, an internist for nearly twenty years,] closed his office, he said,
because he was constantly justifying his decisions to insurance companies and Federal
Medicare clerks. "It's terribly aggravating and annoying," he said. "It's an affront
every single day. I like to think that I practice good medicine, and to have someone
second-guess you all the time wears you down."
Id.; see also Barbara H. Warren et al., Cost Containment and Quality of Life: An
Eperiment in Compassionfor Physicians, 151 ARC IVEs INTERNAL MED. 741 (1991).
mhe demands [of managed care] can be overwhelming as auditors look over primary-
care providers' shoulders and third-party payers continue to increase their
administrative requirements for monitoring of utilization and cost controls. The effect of
managed-care policies on the "beleaguered physician" deserves attention. New medical
trainees are avoiding primary care because of today's pressures in this era of medical
cost containment as the demands mount and the rewards seem less than adequate.
Id. at 741.
188 See, e.g., RONALD R. GILBERT & J. DOUGLAS PETERS, SOCIAL SECURITY
DISABILrY CLAIMS §§ 2:3-:14, 4:3-:9 (1993) (19 sections of a practitioner's guide
discussing obtaining medical evidence and developing the record in a Social Security
disability claim); HARVEY L. MCCORMICK, SOCIAL SECURrrY CLAMS AND PROCEDURES
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training and experience in developing claims records; lay claimants do not.
The Perry ruling does not take account of the practical obstacles that
prevent most claimants from developing complete records before plan
administrators. A better approach to de novo review is offered by the Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals in Moon v. American Home Assurance Co.'8 9 The
court in Moon concluded that limiting review to the evidence available to the
plan administrator at the time of the benefits denial would be "contrary to the
concept" of de novo review. 190
In more recent decisions, a number of courts have seemed to search for
middle ground between Perry and Moon. In Luby v. Teamsters Health,
Welfare, & Pension Trust Funds,191 the Third Circuit followed Moon and held
that a court conducting de novo review of an ERISA decision is not limited to
the evidence before the plan administrator.19 2 However, the court noted that its
decision did not require a de novo evidentiary hearing or full trial if the record
on review were sufficiently developed. 193
In Masella v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Connecticut, Inc.,194 Blue Cross
denied an ERISA-plan claim on the basis that certain treatment was dental
rather than medical in nature.195 The district court received expert testimony
regarding the nature and treatment of claimant's condition, temporomandibular
joint dysfunction, to assist it in interpreting the terms of the plan. 196 The
Second Circuit Court of Appeals approved the admission of expert testimony
relevant to interpreting the terms of the plan, but suggested that even if the
Perry rule were accepted, "evidence regarding the proper interpretation of the
terms of the plan.., would be treated differently from evidence intended to
establish a particular historical fact regarding the claimant, like the evidence of
the date of total disability at issue in Peny."197
In Quesinberry v. Life Insurance Co. of North America,19" the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals sought to balance the multiple purposes of ERISA by
§§ 621-87 (4th ed. 1991) (67 sections of a practitioner's guide discussing evidence in a
Social Security claim); ALAN BALSAM, M.D., & ALBERT P. ZABIN, DisABiLrrY HANDBOOK
(1990 & Supp. 1993) (996-page book with 221-page supplement discussing evaluation and
evidence of disability).
189 888 F.2d 86 (11th Cir. 1989).
190 Id. at 89.
191 944 F.2d 1176 (3d Cir. 1991).
192 Id. at 1184-85.
193 Id. at 1185.
194 936 F.2d 98 (2d Cir. 1991).
195 Id. at 100-01.
196 Id. at 102.
19 7 Id. at 104.
198 987 F.2d 1017 (4th Cir. 1993).
1994]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
adopting a discretionary approach to scope of review.199 The court noted the
concerns expressed in Bruch, Moon, and Luby that ERISA be construed to
protect the rights of employees and their beneficiaries and to afford no less
protection than employees and beneficiaries had before ERISA's enactment. 200
However, the court also emphasized the objectives identified in Perry and
Berry v. Ciba-Geigy Corp.,201 a pre-Bruch Fourth Circuit case. The latter
objectives are to provide prompt resolution of claims and to prevent district
courts from becoming substitute plan administrators.2°2 In the court's view,
these objectives warranted "significant restraints on the district court's ability
to allow evidence beyond what was presented to the administrator." 20 3 The
court adopted a scope of review that gives the trial court discretion to receive
evidence that was not before the plan administrator. 2°4 However, the court
narrowed the discretion to allow such evidence, stating that the trial court's
discretion should be exercised "only when circumstances clearly establish that
additional evidence is necessary to conduct an adequate de novo review of the
benefit decision."205 In "most cases," according to the court, allowing
additional evidence would not be appropriate.2°6
One commentator has proposed that rather than admitting or excluding new
evidence, courts should remand benefits claims to ERISA-plan administrators
for reconsideration. 20 7 Among the arguments for this "liberal remand policy"
are that it would reduce the burdens on the courts,20 8 would "utilize the
practical strengths of plan administrators to develop evidence," 2°9 and would
"help avoid 'adversarial litigation' in favor of private dispute resolution." 210
199 Id. at 1026-27.
200 Id. at 1023-25.
201 761 F.2d 1003, 1007 (4th Cir. 1985).
2 02 Quesinberry, 987 F.2d at 1025.
203 Id.
2 04 Id.
205 Id.
206 Id.; see also Casey v. Uddeholm Corp., 32 F.3d 1094, 1099 (7th Cir. 1994) (im de
novo review, the court "may limit the evidence to the record before the plan administrator,
or it may permit the introduction of additional evidence necessary to enable it to make an
informed and independent judgment"); Donatelli v. Home Ins. Co., 992 F.2d 763, 765 (8th
Cir. 1993) (m de novo review, the court may allow evidence not presented to the fiduciary
but "should not exercise this discretion absent good cause to do so").
2 07 See Robert M. Hogg, Note, The Evidentiary Scope of De Novo Review in ERISA
Benefits Litigation After Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 78 MINN. L. REV. 1575,
1601-06 (1994).2 08 Id. at 1601.
209 Id. at 1606.
2 10 ld. at 1602-03.
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Although theoretically understandable, such an approach is misconceived
because it ignores litigation realities. Remand for reconsideration is wholly
unnecessary and from the claimant's perspective will virtually always be an
exercise in futility. Remand is not necessary to give a plan administrator "an
opportunity to reverse the decision denying benefits." 211 An administrator who
is willing to reconsider a benefits determination in light of additional evidence
can do so at any time during the litigation process. What will in fact encourage
a plan administrator to reconsider a denial of benefits or to offer a fair
settlement is not remand but the approach of a firm trial date.212 In a process
already stacked against claimants, a "liberal policy of remand" would give
additional tactical advantage to insurers and administrators. Even if, in face of
the contrary state of the law, a claimant manages to find an attorney and then,
with effort and expense, commences to seek what ERISA promises-ready
access to the federal courts and appropriate remedies213-the claimant would
face the new and unnecessary obstacle of remand, increasing the claimant's
burdensome litigation costs, further delaying any prospect of impartial de novo
review, and postponing the time when settlement might be possible. In all but
the most unusual cases, remand for reconsideration would play into defendants'
basic strategy-delay-while denying, as a practical matter, what plaintiffs
seek-a day of reckoning.
Refinements of the Peny approach, like the Perty approach itself, may
frustrate plaintiffs' ability to obtain full judicial review. Although limited
allowance of new evidence as authorized by Quesinbeny is preferable to
complete refusal to receive such evidence as required by Perry, it nevertheless
is inconsistent with de novo review to deny plaintiffs the opportunity to
introduce evidence outside the administrative record when plaintiffs believe that
this is necessary. Given the many practical disadvantages facing claimants
during the development of the administrative record, de novo review on a fully
developed record will not be assured unless plaintiffs have the right to offer
new evidence. Review limited by the trial court's discretion to review of
administrative records-records created and controlled by professional claims
managers denying the claims of generally unrepresented lay persons-seems
certain to perpetuate unfairness in many cases.214
211 See a at 1601.
212 It is a truism of settlement dynamics that defendants offer fair settlements not when
they are shown evidence that supports or establishes plaintiffs' contentions but when
litigation timetables give them financial incentive to settle.
213 See 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b).
2 14 Participants are often at a serious disadvantage when they question claims
decisions. On their own, such participants must navigate the murky, frightening and
often treacherous waters of the plan's claims procedures, usually without either an up-
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Southern Farm Bureau Life Insurance Co. v. Moore215 is an example of
how far astray courts following Pierre and Perry have wandered from ERISA's
stated purpose, "to protect... the interests of participants in employee benefit
plans and their beneficiaries... by providing... ready access to the Federal
courts." 2 16 Moore involved a claim for accidental death benefits under an
ERISA-plan life insurance policy. 217 The central question in the case was a
complex factual question-whether the decedent's death in an automobile
collision and fire was caused or contributed to by a brain tumor. The
beneficiary filed a claim for benefits with the plan administrator. After the plan
administrator had conducted an investigation, the administrator proceeded
directly to federal court without complying with ERISA requirements that
notice of claim denial be given. 218 The required notice of denial should have
provided "[tihe specific reason or reasons for the denial," "[a] description of
any additional material or information necessary for the claimant to perfect the
claim and an explanation of why such material or information is necessary,"
and "[a]ppropriate information as to the steps to be taken if the participant or
beneficiary wishes to submit his or her claim for review." 219 At trial, the
claimant presented expert medical testimony supporting her claim, and based
on a jury verdict in her favor, the court entered judgment for the full policy
amount. 220 On appeal, however, the Fifth Circuit, following Pierre, held that
the trial court had erred in reviewing the plan administrator's decision de novo
and in receiving evidence that was not before the plan administrator when the
decision to deny benefits was made.221
A close reading of the court's statement of facts reveals that the "evidence
that was before the plan administrator when he made his decision to deny
benefits" was limited entirely to the evidence generated by the plan
to-date navigational chart or an experienced guide. In contrast, employers, plans, and
insurance contractors have many advantages: first, they make the initial design choices
and have the ongoing ability to alter the plan; second, they create the bureaucracy to
administer the plan and therefore understand how to make the bureaucracy work for
them; and third, they are supported by a well-paid flotilla of service providers and
advisors.
H.R. REP. No. 1023, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 27 (1992).
215 993 F.2d 98 (5th Cir. 1993).
216 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b).
2 17 Moore, 993 F.2d at 99-100.
218 Id. ERISA requirements for notification to claimant of a decision are set forth at 29
C.F.R. §§ 2560.503-1(e)-(f (1993).
219 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(0 (1993).
220 Moore, 993 F.2d at 100.
221 Id. at 100-02.
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administrator's investigation. 222 The claimant's opportunity to submit evidence
had been thwarted by the administrator's failure to follow ERISA regulations.
Nevertheless, the appellate court refused to consider the evidence presented at
trial by the claimant, holding in accord with Pierre that judicial review of a
factual determination must be limited to the evidence available to the plan
administrator. 223 Moreover, the court conducted its review of the central issue
in the case with deference to the determination of the plan administrator, the
life insurance company denying the claim.224 In an ironic but meaningless
concession to Bruch, the court held that it would consider evidence not before
the administrator in reviewing de novo the administrator's "interpretation of the
policy" but that there was no such evidence.225
The ruling in Moore exemplifies the assessment of one commentator: "The
current law pays little attention to ERISA's central purpose of safeguarding
benefit expectations. Indeed, it often seems perversely designed to thwart
benefit expectations, for no better reason than judicial force of habit. "226
C. Ready Access to the Federal Courts. An Unflfilled Promise
In many ERISA opinions, federal judges have made clear that they do not
consider federal courts well-suited to adjudicate ERISA health care and other
benefits disputes.227 Some federal judges have expressed a certain disdain for
what they characterize as routine, mundane matters raised by ERISA claims.228
Federal judges have commented on the "burgeoning" ERISA caseload. 229
Moreover, the Judicial Conference of the United States, the principal policy
making body of the federal judiciary, has expressed concern about clogging the
222 Id. at 99-100.
223 Id. at 101-02.
224 Id.
225 Id. at 102.
226 Conison, supra note 163, at 3.
227 Some opinions suggest that judges were not meant to function as "substitute plan
administrators." See, e.g., Taft v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 9 F.3d 1469, 1472 (9th
Cir. 1993); Pierre v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 932 F.2d 1552, 1559 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 453 (1991); Perry v. Simplicity Eng'g, 900 F.2d 963, 966 (6th Cir.
1990). Opinions say that plan administrators are intended to have primary responsibility for
claim processing. See, e.g., Wolfe v. J.C. Penney Co., 710 F.2d 388, 394 (7th Cir. 1983).
Other opinions suggest that plan administrators have advantages that the courts do not have:
they are closer to the facts and the investigation of claims. See, e.g., Pierre, 932 F.2d at
1562.
228 See, e.g., Pierre, 932 F.2d at 1559.
229 See, e.g., Crespo v. Candela Laser Corp., 780 F. Supp. 866, 867 (D. Mass.
1992).
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federal courts with health care benefits disputes. The Judicial Conference has
taken the position that such disputes should be resolved in administrative
proceedings and then, if necessary, in state courts. 23 °
The foregoing factors-joined, perhaps, with the judiciary's fear of
"opening the floodgates"-have no doubt influenced the twenty-year
transformation of ERISA from legislation intended to "'promote the interests of
employees and their beneficiaries in employee benefit plans'" 23 1 and "'protect
contractually defined benefits,'" 23 2 to an Act judicially construed to shield
employers, insurers, and plan administrators. As already discussed, the federal
courts have interpreted ERISA to preempt most state common law and
regulatory protections for claimants23 3 while recognizing few federal remedies
for claimants' damages, injuries, or losses;23 4 they have denied claimants
make-whole relief and have barred punitive damages,23 5 even in cases of the
230 See Robert Pear, U.S. Judges Warn of Health Lawsuits, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 16,
1994, at A13; Marianne Lavelle, Judges Fear Health Care Suits, NAT'L L.J, Aug. 29,
1994, at A6. "[The] Judicial Conference [called on] Congress to assure that the courts are a
last and rare resort for patients who want to challenge denial or delay of benefits by their
insurer" and said that "state courts-not federal courts-should be the primary forum for
such disputes." Id. The concerns of the Judicial Conference were expressed in the context
of national health care reform but are equally applicable to ERISA health care benefits
cases.
To an important degree, the increase in ERISA cases docketed in the federal courts has
been fostered by the courts themselves. Although ERISA establishes concurrent state and
federal jurisdiction over ERISA benefits claims, see 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(1), virtually all
such cases brought by plaintiffs in state courts are now removed by defendants seeking the
accommodating procedures and results defendants are more likely to obtain in the federal
courts. Review of the annotations to 29 U.S.C.A. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (West 1985 & Supp.
1994), the ERISA section allowing an action to recover benefits due under the terms of a
plan, shows that almost all actions for benefits under ERISA are brought in or removed to
federal court. Because ERISA preempts state common law claims, state actions that purport
to raise only state law claims are "necessarily federal in character" and therefore removable
to federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(0). Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S.
58, 67 (1987).
The burden of ERISA cases on the courts has also been increased by the absence of
any impartial administrative review process applicable to ERISA benefits claims.
231 Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 113 (1989) (quoting Shaw
v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 90 (1983)).
2 32 Id. (quoting Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 148
(1985)).
233 See supra part IR.
2 34 See supra part IV.
235 See supra part IV.
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most willful and outrageous conduct by defendants;23 6 they have insisted on
treating ERISA cases as review proceedings rather than actions for enforcement
of claimants' rights;23 7 they have adopted a rule of deference to the decisions of
employers, insurers, and plan administrators, 23 8 and have curtailed the scope of
de novo review in the few cases allowing it;23 9 they have enforced procedural
and evidentiary rules that weigh heavily against claimants; 24° they have adopted
an inapposite test that usually denies attorney's fees to prevailing plaintiffs. 241
It is impossible to read the minds of individual judges, and it is difficult to
assess the effect of the judiciary's dissatisfaction with its role in adjudicating
ERISA benefits claims, but, whatever the reasons, the effect of judicial
construction of ERISA must be understood. Over twenty years, judicial
decisions have stacked the deck against claimants and have severely limited the
availability of the appropriate remedies, sanctions for wrongful conduct, and
ready access to the federal courts that were promised by ERISA.
VI. REMiEDIS FOR WRONGFUL CLAMS DENIAL AND INSURER ABUSE
Three quite different approaches have been proposed for lessening the
impact of the judicial decisions discussed in this Article. The most limited of
these approaches is a simple amendment of ERISA to preserve state law
remedies against insurers from preemption. A more comprehensive reform
would amend ERISA to establish federal administrative procedures and judicial
remedies for improper handling of benefits claims. A third approach, proposed
as part of national health care reform, would limit the application of ERISA to
health care plans and would establish within the framework of general health
care legislation a new system of procedures, administrative hearings, and
judicial review intended to protect health care claimants.
A. Preserving State Law Remedies from Preemption
An early legislative approach to restoring ERISA claimants' remedies was
the effort to amend ERISA to make clear that damages actions against
insurance companies based on state statutory or common law are not preempted
236 See, e.g., Howe v. Varity Corp., 36 F.3d 746, 752, 755 (8th Cir. 1994).
237 See supra part V.A.3.
23 8 See supra part V.A.
2 39 See supra part V.B.
240 See supra part V.B.
241 See infra part VI.B.5.
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by ERISA. Senate Bill 794,242 introduced in the 102d Congress, would have
amended the ERISA preemption provisions to read:
[N]othing in this title shall be construed to relieve or exempt-
(ii) any insurance company from any provision of the statutory or common law
of any State to the extent that such provision provides a remedy against
insurance companies regarding such companies' practices in administering an
employee benefit plan or in processing insurance claims thereunder.243
Among the advantages of this approach is that it respects the policy of
preserving state regulation of insurance, a policy that arguably is reflected in
the language of ERISA and is embodied in the McCarran-Ferguson Act. This
approach also respects concepts of federalism in that it neither enlarges nor
limits remedies against insurance companies available under state laws. This
approach would protect against the overly broad application of federal
preemption to state law issues like medical malpractice.244
Among the disadvantages of this approach are that it does not provide any
remedy for unfair claims practices when the law of a particular state does not
provide such a remedy, and that it does not provide any remedy at all against
unfair practices by self-insured ERISA plans. This approach would also be
criticized by those who view uniformity as a central principle of ERISA. 245
B. Establishing Federal Remedies Under ERISA
The second approach to reform of ERISA is much more ambitious. House
Bill 1881,246 the proposed Health Insurance Claims Fairness Act of 1993,247
would (1) add specific statutory time frames for processing ERISA welfare
benefits claims; (2) provide for mediation to resolve disputed claims; (3) allow
242 S. 794, 102d Cong., lst Sess. (1991).
243 Id. § 1(a).
244 See supra text accompanying notes 74-78. For a discussion of the effects of ERISA
on state common law liability and regulatory control of utilization review enterprises, see
Kohler, supra note 13.
245 The Supreme Court emphasized this concern for uniformity in Pilot Life Insurance
Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 55-56 (1987).
246 H.R. 1881, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). H.R 1881 is a revision of H.R. 1602,
102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1991), which had been introduced and amended in the previous
Congress. H.R. REP. No. 1023, 102d Cong., 2d Seas. (1992), to accompany H.R. 1602,
offers much analysis applicable to H.R. 1881.
247 H.R. 1881 § 1.
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a federal action for actual damages, including compensatory and consequential
damages, caused by violation of ERISA or the terms of an ERISA plan; and (4)
authorize judges to award punitive damages against certain parties in cases of
fraud.248 This bill took an approach almost the opposite of Senate Bill 794 by
creating federal remedies rather than saving state remedies from preemption.
Detailed analysis of this lengthy bill is beyond the scope of this Article, but
some attention should be given to several provisions of the bill.
1. ADR Procedures
The establishment of mediation procedures249 would provide a useful
alternative for many claimants, helping in particular to resolve claims in which
disputes are based on misunderstanding or absence of complete information. 250
The bill would also require the Secretary of Labor to establish a Welfare Plan
Claims Assistance Program.25 1
2. Amendment of Section 502 (a) (1) (B)
House Bill 1881 would make significant changes in section 502 of ERISA,
the civil enforcement provisions. The bill would amend section 502(a)(1)(B) 25 2
by adding the following italicized language:
A civil action may be brought by a participant or beneficiary to recover
benefits due to him under the terms of his plan or the provisions of this title, to
enforce his rights under the terms of his plan or the provisions of this title, or
to clarify his rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan or the
24 8 H.R. REP. No. 1023, supra note 246, at 15-16.
249 See H.R. 1881 § 3.
250 The House Report regarding H.R. 1602, the prior version of H.R. 1881, states:
H.R. 1602 establishes an early dispute resolution program so that many of the
cases which today wind up in court might be more easily settled without resorting to
litigation. Litigation is an expensive, time-consuming and often frustrating way to
resolve disputes. Substantial barriers exist for participants in securing competent and
reasonably priced legal assistance. Employers and plans would also benefit from
avoiding litigation. Thus an early dispute resolution program holds the promise of
substantial improvement over the current situation for both employers and participants.
H.R. REP. No. 1023, supra note 246, at 29.
251 See H.R. 1881 § 2(d).
252 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B).
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provisions of this litle." 253
Section 502(a)(1)(B) is the only provision of the ERISA enforcement
scheme that allows actions to be brought in state or federal court.25 4 This
amendment would therefore allow an ERISA claimant to bring an action to
enforce the "provisions of this title," including the provisions of the new
subsection of section 502(c), discussed next, in state court, though subject to
removal. 25 5
3. Actual Damages
In the most important change to section 502, House Bill 1881 would add a
new subsection 5 at the end of section 502(c).25 6 This new subsection would
make the named fiduciary25 7 and any insurance contractor25 8 jointly and
severally liable for "actual damages (including compensatory and consequential
damages)" in any case in which a claim for welfare plan benefits is improperly
processed or denied.
By providing a basis for compensatory relief, this provision would reverse
the narrow construction that the courts have placed on ERISA enforcement
253 See H.R. 1881 § 4(b).
254 See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(1).
255 See 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1988).
256 H.R. 1881 § 4(a)(1). The new provision reads:
In any case in which a qualified welfare plan claim is denied in violation of the
terms of the plan or of this title or in which any provision of this title is violated with
respect to the administration of the plan in connection with such a claim or the
processing of such a claim thereunder, the named fiduciary under the plan and any
insurance contractor for the plan administering such claim shall be jointly and severally
liable to any participant, beneficiary, employer, employee organization, or plan
aggrieved by such failure or violation for actual damages (including compensatory and
consequential damages proximately caused by such failure or violation), except that,
subject to subparagraph (B), damages for such failure or violation shall not include
punitive damages.
Id. The use of the phrase "such failure or violation" in two places in this subsection and
again in subsection (B) is awkward. There is no "failure" to which "such failure" can refer.
"[S]uch failure or violation" might better read simply "such violation."
257 "Named fiduciary" would not include a named fiduciary under a multiemployer
plan. See id.; see infra text accompanying notes 269-72.
258 "Insurance contractor" would be broadly defined to include an "insurer" (also
broadly defined) who contracts to provide benefits or administer claims for benefits. See
H.R. 1881 § 2(g).
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actions259 and restore to ERISA claimants the possibility of obtaining adequate
monetary relief for wrongful processing of claims. By allowing recovery of
proven damages beyond the amount of the claim in dispute, this provision
would help to restore balance between parties in ERISA benefits litigation and
aid the resolution of claims by settlement.
4. Punitive Damages
The new damages provision also contains a limited authorization for an
award of punitive damages against the named fiduciary or insurance contractor
when the violation of the terms of a plan or of ERISA constitutes fraud. 260 The
decision to award punitive damages would be left to the discretion of the
judge.261 The committee report regarding House Bill 1602 (a prior version of
House Bill 1881 introduced in the 102d Congress) states: "H.R. 1602 responds
to the potential vacuum that may have been created by the preemption of state
remedies under Pilot Life by providing a deterrent to bad faith behavior by
plans and insurance contractors through the creation of a new ERISA remedy
for fraud." 262
259 See supra part IV.
260 H.R. 1881 § 4(a)(1) (proposed ERISA § 502(c)(5)(B)). "In any case in which a
failure or violation described in subparagraph (A) constitutes fraud, each party liable under
subparagraph (A) may, in the court's discretion, be liable to the plaintiff for punitive or
exemplary damages in addition to damages described in subparagraph (A)." Id.
261 Id. "Punitive or exemplary damages may also be awarded in cases of fraud.
However, a judge (and not a jury) must decide whether punitive damages ought to be
awarded after fraud is determined and, if so, the amount of those damages." H.R. REP. No.
1023, supra note 246, at 31.2 62 H.R. REp. No. 1023, supra note 246, at 30. The committee report states: "The
Committee intends to rely on the definition of fraud taken from the model instructions to
juries that Federal judges use." Id. at 31. One such pattern instruction reads:
Plaintiff's claim against the defendant has six essential elements, as follows:
First, that the defendant represented to the plaintiff that (here set forth the alleged
representation.)
Second, that the representation was false;
Third, (that the representation was known by the defendant to be false when it was
made) (that the defendant made the representation recklessly and without regard to its
truth or falsity) (that defendant told the plaintiff that it had knowledge that the
representation was true, while not having such knowledge);
Fourth, that the plaintiff relied on the representation and was deceived by it;
Fyfh, that the plaintiff acted with ordinary prudence in relying on the
representation, and
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Specifying fraud as the basis for punitive damages is wrong. Fraud is a
complex tort with an ancient history;263 moreover, it is notoriously difficult to
prove.264 The appropriate basis for imposing punitive damages is bad faith, not
fraud. The law of bad faith focuses on wrongful conduct in processing and
settling claims and provides an extensive and well-developed body of law265
upon which judges could call, precisely the law that was nullified for ERISA
claimants by Pilot Life.266 Fraud relates to a narrow range of deceitful conduct.
Bad faith, by contrast, includes fraud but relates to a wider variety of abusive
practices-excessive delay, inadequate investigation, failure to disclose
claimant's rights, threats, exploitation of claimant's vulnerable position, unfair
conditioning of settlement, forced litigation, retaliation, and so forth.267
House Bill 1881 would allow compensatory and punitive damages awards
only against insurance contractors, as broadly defined,268 or the named
fiduciary under a plan, and not against a named fiduciary under a
multiemployer plan.269 Such damages would not be allowed against the ERISA
plan itself,270 and this seems appropriate. However, exempting a named
Sith, that the false representation was the proximate cause of injury to the
plaintiff.
3 EDWARD J. DEvrrr ET AL., FEDERAL JURY PRACHCE AND INsTRUcriONs § 83.02 (1987).
263 See, e.g., W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS
§§ 105-10 (5th ed. 1984).
264 The difficulty in proving fraud comes primarily from the necessity of proving what
is commonly called "scienter," i.e., knowledge or belief on the part of the defendant that a
representation is false, combined with the intention to induce the plaintiff to act in reliance
on the falsehood. See id. § 107. "The state of the speaker's mind, notwithstanding its
elusiveness as a matter of psychology and its difficulty of proof, must be looked to in
determining whether the action of deceit can be maintained." Id.
265 See, e.g., ASHLEY, supra note 31.
266 See supra part I]I.
267 ASHLEY, supra note 31, §§ 5:01-:22.
2 68 See H.R. 1881 § 2(g).
269 See id. § 4(a)(1).
2 70 Ordinarily, an ERISA benefit plan may be sued as an entity. See 29 U.S.C.
§ 1132(d)(1). Any judgment against a plan is ordinarily enforceable only against the plan.
See id. § 1132(d)(2). The committee report accompanying H.R. 1602, the prior version of
H.R. 1881, states:
rIhe Committee believes that section 502(a)(3)(B) of ERISA already authorizes courts
to award actual damages designed to make the aggrieved individual whole when either
the terms of the plan or the Act have been violated. In that respect, H.R. 1602 merely
clarifies current law with respect to the remedies available for benefit claims.
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fiduciary under a multiemployer plan from such damages does not seem
justifiable. The named fiduciaries in multiemployer plans,271 which are
generally union-negotiated plans, are usually the members of a joint union-
management board of trustees. 272 With respect to damages awards, named
fiduciaries in such plans are in no different position than are named fiduciaries
in any plan. The hazard of exempting named fiduciaries in multiemployer plans
is that doing so might encourage the restructuring of single-employer ERISA
plans simply to gain this exemption.
5. Attomey's Fees
House Bill 1881 would also make a helpful change in the ERISA provision
for the award of attorney's fees. Currently, section 502(g)(1) of the Act
provides that "the court in its discretion may allow a reasonable attorney's fee
and costs of action to either party." 273 In determining whether to award fees,
most courts have applied, at least nominally, a five-factor test first enunciated
in Eaves v. Penn.2 74 This test was developed not to determine whether to
award attorney's fees, but to determine whether fees should be awarded under
the common-fund doctrine or assessed directly against the defendant. 275
General application of the Eaves test in ERISA cases has been criticized as
neither logical nor helpful. 276 House Bill 1881 would mandate an award of
attorney's fees and expert witness's fees to prevailing plaintiffs in welfare
H.R. REP. No. 1023, supra note 246, at 30. (The report was drafted before the Supreme
Court's decision in Mertens v. Hewitt Associates, 113 S. Ct. 2063 (1993). See supra notes
115-20 and accompanying text.)
Actual damages under § 502(a)(3)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3)(B), which allows an
action "to obtain other appropriate equitable relief... to redress [violations of ERISA or a
plan]," would be enforceable against the plan. However, notwithstanding assertions in the
committee report that actual damages are available under § 502(a)(3)(B), see H.R. REP.
No. 1023, supra note 246, at 22-23, 30, H.R. 1881 does not amend that specific section or
amend any other section of the Act in a way that is likely to shake the nearly universal
conviction of the courts that such damages are not available under § 502(a)(3)(B). See supra
part V.C.
271 See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(37).
272 See generally Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Calif., Inc. v. Construction Laborers
Pension Trust, 113 S. Ct. 2264, 2271-74 (1993).
273 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1).
274 587 F.2d 453, 464-65 (10th Cir. 1978). See Mark H. Berlind, Note, Attorney's
Fees Under ERISA: When Is an Award Appropriate?, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 1037, 1058-61
(1986) (citing cases).
275 Eaves, 587 F.2d at 465.
276 See Berlind, supra note 274, at 1058-61.
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benefits claims. 277 The amendment would be more rational than the Eaves test,
and it would also help to alleviate the considerable difficulty that ERISA
claimants encounter in attempting to find representation. 278
6. De Novo Review
A noteworthy and potentially troublesome omission from the amendments
proposed by House Bill 1881 concerns the issue of de novo judicial review of
ERISA benefits decisions. Although Firestone ire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch279
requires that "a denial of benefits challenged under § 1132(a)(1)(B) is to be
reviewed under a de novo standard unless the benefit plan gives the
administrator... discretionary authority," 280 the Supreme Court suggested in
Bruch,281 and virtually all lower courts have held, that when the benefits plan
does give the administrator discretionary authority (as surely all but a
dwindling number now do), the decisions of the administrator are to be
reviewed under the deferential abuse-of-discretion or arbitrary-and-capricious
standards. Moreover, some courts have held that all factual determinations are
to be given deference, and other courts have held that all review is to be limited
to evidence put before the administrator. Giving deference to decisions of plan
administrators and limiting review to review on the administrators' records are
unfair to ERISA-plan claimants. 282 Recognizing this, the House Committee on
Education and Labor states in the report accompanying House Bill 1602, the
prior version of House Bill 1881:
277 H.R. 1881 § 5(a)(3).
In any action or settlement proceeding under this title with respect to an employee
welfare benefit plan by a participant or beneficiary under such plan in which the
participant or beneficiary prevails or substantially prevails, the participant or beneficiary
shall be entitled to reasonable attorney's fees and other costs of the action, including
reasonable expert witness fees, to be paid by the opposing party. Fees to which the
participant or beneficiary is entitled under this paragraph shall be at generally prevailing
hourly rates.
Id.
278 See H.R. REP. No. 1023, supra note 246, at 31-32. For an analysis of the benefits
of mandatory awards of attorney's fees to prevailing plaintiffs, see Ann C. Hertino, The
Need for a Mandatory Award of Attorney's Fees for Prevailing Plaintiffs in ERISA Benefits
Cases, 41 CATH. U. L. REv. 871 (1992).
279 489 U.S. 101 (1989). See discussion supra part V.A.2.
2 80 Bruch, 489 U.S. at 115.
281 Id. at 111, 115.
2 82 See supra part V.
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In both types of adjudicatory proceedings (binding arbitration and civil
litigation), the Committee intends the benefit claim denial to be reviewed de
novo. In other words, the committee intends that the parties have the right to
submit new evidence and that no deference be given to the factual findings and
interpretations of plan terms by the decisionmaker below. Limiting the
evidence to what was available to the plan administrator severely penalizes the
participant who does not want or cannot afford to hire a lawyer to identify and
obtain all relevant evidence during the earlier stages of review, and the
Committee disagrees with decisions that limit de novo review to the record
below.283
Although the committee report is clear, the import of the amendments
proposed by House Bill 1881 is not clear. Nothing in House Bill 1881 makes
clear a claimant's right to present new evidence and obtain de novo review in
the courts. Resolution of these matters should not be left to interpretation of the
legislative history, particularly because many courts have shown a preference
for deferential review.284 Amendments to ERISA should authorize the
submission of new evidence to the court and should require de novo
proceedings in all cases.
C. Establishing Federal Remedies As Part of National Health Care
Reform
Efforts to amend ERISA to protect the rights of benefits claimants were
overtaken in the 103d Congress by efforts to enact national health care
legislation. Several of the health care reform proposals introduced in Congress
included provisions designed to protect claimants from wrongful claim denials,
but for the most part, this issue was neglected while public and congressional
debate focused on the cost, the sources of funding, the extent of coverage, and
the appropriate structures for delivery of health care.
The most fully developed provisions for protecting health care claimants'
rights were contained in the health care reform proposal presented by the
Clinton administration. 285 The Health Security Act, as initially proposed,
283 H.R. REP. No. 1023, supra note 246, at 30 (citing with disapproval Perry v.
Simplicity Eng'g, 900 F.2d 963 (6th Cir. 1990)).
284 See upra part V.A.
285 H.R. 3600, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1993); S. 1757, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1993).
Several versions of the bills were introduced, and they are available in LEXIS, LEGIS
Library, BLTEXT File. Citations are to the second version of H.R. 3600.
For valuable analysis of H.R. 3600, particularly with respect to procedural issues and
appropriate review of claims, see Rand E. Rosenblatt, Equality, Entitlement, and National
Health Care Reform The Challenge of Managed Competition and Managed Care, 60
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would (1) establish uniform health plan claims procedures, including time
limits for approval or denial of claims and procedures for review of denials at
the plan level;286 (2) establish complaint review procedures under which
aggrieved claimants could elect alternative dispute resolution, administrative
hearings, or remedies available from courts of competent jurisdiction;287 (3)
provide for review of administrative decisions by a national Health Plan
Review Board and, if the amount in controversy exceeds $10,000, in the
United States courts of appeals;288 and (4) provide for assessment of substantial
civil penalties for wrongful denial or delay of health care claims.289 Several
aspects of the original Clinton health care proposal-House Bill 3600-are
worthy of note.
1. Claims Procedures
House Bill 3600 would establish clear, uniform procedures for the
approval, denial, and review of claims.290 The existing hodgepodge of differing
and often vague claims and review procedures needlessly confuses most
claimants and many health care providers. 291 Results are often inconsistent.2 92
Procedural uniformity would benefit health care consumers.
The bill would also establish appropriate time limits for processing
ordinary and urgent claims.293 Delay in deciding claims is one of the most
common frustrations for claimants, often resulting in needless emotional harm
and financial difficulty. 294 Claims procedures and time limits would be
BROoK. L. REv. 105, 117-37 (1994); Hearings Before the Subconmn. on Health and
Environment of the House Subcomm. on Energy and Commerce, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (Tan.
31, 1994) (statement of Rand E. Rosenblatt, On Access to Justice, Discrimination and
Health Care Reform (original text available in WESTLAW, 1994 WL 213576; revised text
for the record, Feb. 14, 1994, on file with the Ohio State Law Journal)); Committee on
Federal Legislation, Procedural Issues in the 1994 Health Security Act, 49 REc. ASS'N B.
CrrYN.Y. 450 (1994).
286 See H.R. 3600 § 5201.
2 87 See id. §§ 5202-04, 5211.
2 88 See id. § 5205.
289 See id. §§ 5206-07.
290 See id. § 5201.
291 See Severns, supra note 186. "There is no uniformity in due process procedures
from one health plan to the next, in state insurance laws, or in Medicaid procedures, which
vary from state to state." Id.
292 See, e.g., Robert Pear, Medicare C7aim May Be Rejected, It's Found, Depending
on the State, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 1994, at D23.
293 See H.R. 3600 §§ 5201(b)-(d).
294 Delay is a recognized basis for insurance bad faith claims. See ASHLEY, supra note
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enforced by a simple expedient: when health plans fail to comply with
procedures or time limits, claims are deemed approved.295 Specific reasons
would be required for denial of claims.296 Review of claims would include
review by a qualified physician if the resolution of any issues raised by a claim
requires medical expertise.297 Taken together, the procedures for approval,
denial, and review of claims are thoughtfully designed to facilitate fair, prompt,
and understandable resolution of the majority of health care claims.
2. Grievances Based on Acts or Practices by Health Plans
House Bill 3600 would permit persons to file complaints in regional
complaints review offices when they are aggrieved by any act or practice of
any health plan that results in denial or delay of a claim. 29 8 Complainants
would have the opportunity (1) to take advantage of an "Early Resolution
Program" (offering mediation and other forms of alternative dispute
resolution); 299 (2) to proceed with the complaint to an administrative hearing
(with review by an appeals board and, if the amount in controversy exceeds
$10,000, the United States courts of appeals); 3°° or (3) in most cases, to forego
administrative proceedings and rely on remedies available in court.301
Attorney's fees and expert witness's fees could be recovered by prevailing
complainants at the administrative level. 302 Legal and medical expertise is
usually necessary to assure full development of contested claims, and such
expertise is readily available to plan administrators. The fairness of the process
is thus enhanced because prevailing claimants are able to be reimbursed for
attorney and expert witness fees.
The flexibility of the complaint procedures set forth in House Bill 3600 is
admirable. Most disputes, especially those arising from misunderstanding,
should be resolved by the ADR procedures. 303 More substantial disputes could
be taken to administrative hearings or to court, at the complainants' option.
31, § 5:06.
295 See H.R. 3600 §§ 5201(b)(1), (c)(2).
296 See id. §§ 5201(b)(1), (e).297 See id. § 5201(b)(4)(C).
298 See id. § 5202.
299 See id. §§ 5203(a)(2), 5211-15.
300 See id. §§ 5203(a)(3), 5204, 5205.
301 See id. § 5203 (a)(1).
302 See id. §§ 5204(d)(2)(A)(iv), 5205(g).
303 See id. §§ 5211-15.
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3. De Novo Review
Under House Bill 3600, review at the plan level and at administrative
hearings would be de novo.304 The assurance of de novo review is important
for claimants because, by contrast with professional claims administrators,
claimants usually lack the knowledge or skill necessary to develop a fully
documented claims record in the first instance.305 The bill does not address the
scope of judicial review, however, and this is an unfortunate omission.3°6
Claimants should be permitted to submit all relevant evidence to courts, and
court proceedings should be de novo in all cases.
4. Compensatory and Consequential Damages
Although House Bill 3600 would establish comprehensive procedures for
dealing with wrongful claims, denials, and delays, it would assure only limited
and in many cases uncertain remedies. At the administrative level, a hearing
officer would have authority to order payment of benefits due and payment of
prejudgment interest on the "actual costs incurred in obtaining the items and
services at issue." 30 7 However, the hearing officer would lack authority to
award compensatory or consequential damages, even if bad faith denial or
delay of a claim may have caused substantial harm to the claimant. 308
Whether House Bill 3600 would make compensatory or consequential
damages available in court raises complex questions regarding jurisdiction,
exclusive remedy, ERISA exemption, and preemption of state law. Such
damages clearly would be available in certain actions. Individuals would be
afforded private rights of action to enforce the responsibilities of states, federal
agencies, and regional or corporate alliances and could recover compensatory
and punitive damages in such actions.309 Individuals could also recover
compensatory and punitive damages from health plans for discrimination based
on "race, national origin, sex, language, socio-economic status, age, disability,
health status, or anticipated need for health services." 310 But the ability of
individuals to recover compensatory, consequential, or punitive damages for
304 Id. § 5201(b)(4)(A). If the resolution of any issues requires medical expertise,
reviews at the plan level would include review by a qualified physician. Id. § 5201(b)(4)(C).
305 See supra notes 186-88 and accompanying text.
306 See supra part V.B.307 H.R. 3600 § 5204(d)(2).
308 The Secretary of Labor could assess substantial civil penalties against health plans
for unreasonable denial or delay in the payment or provision of benefits. Id. § 5207.
309 See id. §§ 5235-37.
310 Id. § 1402(c); see also id. § 5238.
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wrongful delay or denial of claims against health plans, insurers, or plan
administrators would be ruled out in some instances3 1 and in others would be
subject to construction of uncertain provisions regarding exclusive relief, the
application of ERISA, federal preemption, and the application of state law. 312
The bill needs an unambiguous provision for state and federal jurisdiction to
award compensatory and, if appropriate, punitive damages for wrongful denial
of health care claims or abusive claims practices.
5. Limited to Health Care Claims
House Bill 3600 is universal health care legislation that would offer
protection to employees and nonemployees for health care claims.313 However,
unlike House Bill 1881,314 it would not offer protection to employees for other
ERISA-plan benefits claims, such as disability, death benefits, or other
employee benefits claims.
VII. THE ELEmENTs OF BASIC RFORM
Justice Doggett of the Texas Supreme Court has written about ERISA:
"Through peculiar federal judicial interpretation, a statutory addition to
workers' rights has been converted into a statutory removal of those rights. The
law has been reshaped into a form that achieves the converse of its original
purpose." 315 To restore one of ERISA's central purposes-protecting the
311 See id. § 5202(d). Administrative proceedings under §§ 5203 and 5204 of the bill
would be the exclusive means of review of the acts or practices of a corporate alliance
health plan. Id.
3 12 H.R. 3600 would permit a complainant to seek remedies available in courts of
competent jurisdiction, except when the bill establishes the exclusive means of review. See
id. § 5203(a)(1). H.R. 3600 also expressly provides that existing rights and remedies would
not be preempted "except to the extent the right or remedy is inconsistent with this title."
Id. § 5243. In a complex and ambiguous provision, H.R. 3600 also would amend BRISA to
bring some health plans but not others under title I of ERISA and to make ERISA
preemption rules apply to some health plans but not others. See id. § 8402. Applying H.R.
3600's provisions regarding exclusive remedies, nonpreemption of existing rights and
remedies, and partial amendment of ERISA (including the ERISA preemption provision) in
the already muddy context of prior ERISA preemption analysis would lead to anything but
clear and certain remedies for claimants.
3 13 See ij. § 1001.
3 14 See supra part VI.B.
315 Cathey v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 805 S.W.2d 387, 392 (rex. 1991) (Doggett,
J., concurring), ceit. denied, 501 U.S. 1232 (1991); see also Conison, supra note 163, at
62 ("The extent to which the law has developed without any consideration of ERISA's
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interests of participants in employee benefits plans-the following basic reforms
should be adopted.
1. Clear, uniform procedures should be required for the fir and timely
deciding and plan-level review of claims.316 Expedited procedures should apply
to urgent claims. Review should include review by a qualified physician if
resolution of issues requires medical expertise.3 17
2. Notice of claim denials should be understandable; should set forth
specific reasons for denial; should refer to plan provisions on which denial is
based; and should describe any additional information or evidence necessary
for approval of a claim, explaining why such additional information or
evidence is necessary. 318
purposes, principles, language and legislative history is remarkable, and stands as paradigm
of how federal courts should not develop common law."); H.R. REP. No. 1023, supra note
246, at 26 ("[C]urrent court interpretations of ERISA have removed disincentives to unfair
claims practices and have weakened the ability of participants to enforce their rights under
ERISA. As a result, the balance struck in ERISA between the competing interests of plan
sponsors and participants has been upset.").
3 16 Experience with health maintenance organizations illustrates the importance of a
clearly defined path to problem resolution. Many plans impose an ill-defined "grievance
process," others include arbitration clauses.
Due process in health care requires particular attention to promptness and access
to information, including nonbiased expert opinion. These elements are almost
universally lacking.
Severns, supra note 186; see also Susan J. Stayn, Note, Securing Access to Care in Health
Maintenance Organizations: Toward a Uniform Model of Grievance and Appeal
Procedures, 94 COLUM. L. Rnv. 1674 (1994).
3 17 Increasingly, nonphysicians are second-guessing treating physicians in deciding
claims or making managed care decisions. See supra note 187.
318 Such notice is required by current regulations. See 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(f)
(1993); Halpin v. W.W. Grainger, Inc., 962 F.2d 685, 688-89 (7th Cir. 1992). However,
compliance with the regulations is frequently lacking. The following form language from an
ERISA-plan claim denial by Aetna Life Insurance Co. is typical:
Your plan provides benefits for services and supplies, but only if they are
necessary for the treatment of an injury or disease. Based on the information provided,
it appears this expense is not covered. Please let us know if there is additional
information that should be brought to our attention.
Aetna Record at 143-76, Schachner v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., No. 89 Civ. 6403,
1992 WL 380912 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 4, 1992) (evidentiary document containing numerous
denial notices using identical generic language). This denial notice does not comply with the
regulation because no "specific reason... for the denial" is set forth; no "[s]pecific
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3. Alternative dispute resolution programs should be established to
facilitate the early, informal resolution of disputed claims. Impartial
administrative review procedures should be available to review claims that
cannot be resolved informally. Such review should be quick and procedurally
simple. Ombudsmen should be available to assist claimants, and hearing
officers should be charged to develop adequate records. 319
4. Claimants' rights to bring an action in court to recover benefits or to
enforce rights should be assured. Such actions should be treated as plenary
actions for benefits, not as judicial review proceedings. 320
5. Relevant additional evidence should be received at the administrative
and judicial levels. Evidence must not be excluded merely because it was not
offered at the initial stages of a claim by a lay claimant.321
6. Deference to the interpretations or decisions of insurers or plan
administrators is not appropriate. Such parties are not neutral or disinterested.
All proceedings should be de novo.322
7. Courts should have jurisdiction to award compensatory damages when
wrongful denial or delay of claims has caused provable harm. Punitive damages
should be available when bad faith or outrageous conduct on the part of
insurers or plan administrators is established. 323
8. Reasonable attorney's fees and expert witness's fees should be awarded
to prevailing plaintiffs. 324
9. Claimants should have the same procedural and remedial rights under
self-insured benefits plans as they have under insurance-based plans. 32s
10. Basic rights and safeguards should be established legislatively. Laws or
regulations should require that plans be administered and benefits decisions be
made in good faith, with due care, without undue delay, and without
reference to pertinent plan provisions" is made; no "description of any additional material
or information necessary for the claimant to perfect the claim" is given; and there is no
"explanation of why such material or information is necessary." See 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-
1(0 (1993).
319 Effective use of ADR procedures and impartial administrative review procedures
would give claimants timely, meaningful recourse when claims were disputed. Resort to
litigation would be unnecessary in all but the most unusual cases.320 See supra part V.A.3.
321 See supra part V.B.
322 See supra part V.
323 See H.R. REP. No. 1023, supra note 246, at 27 ("[IThe lack of effective remedies
for unfair claims practices means that ERISA does not provide the strong deterrence
necessary to assure that claims are not denied because of gross negligence or willfull [sic]
actions.").
32 4 See supra part VI.B.5.
325 See supra part II.C.
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misrepresentation or other unfair practices. The courts should be charged
specifically to develop a body of federal common law-drawing upon common
law principles of contracts, torts, insurer bad faith, trusts, and remedies-
defining rights and obligations under ERISA and assuring remedies for
injustice. 326
These reforms-none of them remarkable and all of them consistent with
state law remedies that currently exist in many jurisdictions-would help
restore fairness and integrity to the processing of health care, disability, and
other employee benefits claims under ERISA.3 27
Opponents of reform argue that assuring claimants procedural fairness and
meaningful remedies will have "destructive" effects on current managed-care
practices. 328 In the view of one commentator:
Taken together, the ERISA amendments-with the specter of punitive
damages, deadlines that inhibit thorough investigations of claims, and broad
326 The Supreme Court has suggested that the courts are to develop a federal common
law of rights and obligations under ERISA. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489
U.S. 101, 110 (1989); Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 56 (1987); see also
Zanglein, supra note 105, at 723 (urging that federal courts "seize the opportunity to fill in
ERISA's gaps with federal common law"); Carn & Liebross, supra note 5.
327 Justice, in its procedural and substantive aspects, should be one of the fundamental
measures of health care reform. See Lawrence 0. Gostin, Forward: Health Care Reform in
the United States: 7he Presidential Task Force, 19 AM. J.L. & MED. 1, 15-17 (1993).
A procedurally fair system would put in place impartial, speedy, and effective
mechanisms for review of the grievances and complaints of consumers. Denials of care
would not be unilateral decisions of non-physician managers, but would be subject to
review at the initiative of the health care professional and/or patient. Alternative dispute
resolution at the plan level, fair hearings at the health alliance level, and speedy access
to the courts would all help assure a procedurally just system that respected the rights of
informed consumers.
Lawrence 0. Gostin, Health Care Reform in the United States, 21 J.L. MED. & ETHIcs 6,
8-9 (1993).
328 See, e.g., Robert Macaulay Jr., Clinton's Proposed Amendments to ERISA
Threaten to Undo the Cost-Containment Gains Achieved Under Managed Care, NAT'L L.T.,
Jan. 31, 1994, at 29; see also Bills Relating to ERISA's Preemption of Certain State Laws:
Hearings on H.R. 1602 and H.R. 2782 Before the Subcomm. on Labor-Managment
Relations of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 92-93
(1991) (statement of James A. Dorsch). "It would be a serious public policy mistake to
amend ERISA in such a way as to damage the ability to make... managed care decisions
by hanging over the head of such decision makers a threat of a punitive damages award."
Id. at93.
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rights of appeal, including de novo hearings-would drop a wrecking ball on
the managed-care procedures that health plans and employers have struggled to
build during the last 10 years. 329
Other opponents draw on the rhetoric of medical malpractice debate,
arguing that ERISA reform will encourage "defensive claims practices," akin
in their view to "defensive medicine." 330 Health plans will be "sitting ducks
for punitive damage awards," and "popping noises from plaintiffs' lawyers
uncorking champagne bottles will echo across America." 331
In truth, however, the opponents of ERISA reform seem primarily
concerned about losing the multiple advantages accorded to employers, plan
administrators, and insurers by judicial interpretation of ERISA. They oppose
closing the "ERISA Umbrella," which "offers a wealth of strategic advantages
in defending insurers against claims of improper administration of employee
benefit plans." 332 They would like to continue operating in what has become
"a regulation-free zone." 333 In opposing reform, they focus almost exclusively
on issues of managed care, cost containment, and expediency; they largely
ignore ERISA's fundamental purpose: establishing standards of conduct,
responsibility, and obligation for benefits plan administrators and protecting the
interests of participants in employee benefits plans by providing appropriate
remedies, sanctions, and ready access to the courts. 334
329 Macaulay, supra note 328.
330 H.R. REP. No. 1023, supra note 246, at 68 (minority views). "To avoid expensive
litigation, it can be anticipated that plans and insurers will also begin paying questionable
claims which would have previously been denied. New approaches to managing and
controlling rapidly escalating health care costs will also be discouraged." Id.
331 Macaulay, supra note 328.
332 Nolan & Bumgardner, supra note 6, at 25.
333 Widiss & Gostin, supra note 69, at 654-55 ("ERISA, adopted almost twenty years
ago to protect employees, now allows employers to enter what is, in effect, a regulation-free
zone.").
334 See 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b).
For lawyers representing the consumers of health care, it is clear that the design of
the problem resolution system will be one of the most critical elements of health care
reform legislation. The Clinton plan for due process will undoubtedly draw fire from
insurers, providers and states who see provisions for damages and attorney fees as a
potential liability. Strong medicine is needed, however, to keep the process honest.
Severns, supra note 186.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
According to Stephen S. Ashley, an authority on insurance law:
A hundred years ago, insurance companies dwelt in a blessed state. An
insurer, faced with the choice whether to settle a claim against its insured or to
pay a claim of its insured, knew that if it refused to settle or pay, it would
never have to spend more than the limits of its liability as set forth in the
insurance policy, even if the insured filed suit against the insurer for breach of
contract. 335
Insurance companies underwriting ERISA benefits plans and administrators
of self-insured plans dwell in that same blessed state today. Judicial
construction of ERISA has assured them that they will never have to pay more
than the amount of benefits originally due, no matter what abuses they might
commit or what harm they might cause. Moreover, their decisions will be
reviewed with deference by the courts, and often on a record limited to the
evidence that they have assembled. ERISA was enacted to protect employees,
and protection of employees with legitimate health care claims is needed more
than ever in this period of aggressive cost containment by insurance companies
and plan administrators. There is little hope for reversal in the trend of judicial
decisions; legislative reform is required.
335 ASHLEY, supra note 31, § 1:01.
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